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PREFACE 
Thl? international significance of the Korean development 
experience lies, most importantly, in the hope that this re- 
markable economic performance gives other nations in their quest 
for national xonomic progress and in improving the lives ef 
their citizenry, and, secondarily, in the information it imparts 
to donors or lenders on how to improve the development process zr 
ensure that funds are repaid. 
This hope is not spurious t l d  Korea is not unique, but there 
are dangers in lightly abstracting from the Korean experience 
without carefully distinguishing between those elements that are 
uniquely Korean and general lessons that might be learned from 
that effort. This paper hopes to clarify some of the issues. 
Inevitably, some will remain clouded. 
Korean economic development in its various attributes has 
perhaps been more studied than similar national economic changes 
in the contemporary world. Ten volumes have been published by 
the Harvard University Press alone for the Harvard Institute for 
International Development; the Korean Development Institute, a 
collaborator in those studies, aas its own impressive publication 
list. There are more Ph.D. dissertations in the United States on 
Korean economics than in any other field of Korean studies. 
There is, of course, a whole body of literature in the Korean 
language, and Korean economics is also a subject for both the 
Japanese academic and popular presses. 
This interest in Korean development has reflected economic 
growth and bred proliferation of academic publications. The 
literature is now so extensive that it is difficult, except for 
the specialist with command of at least three languages, to 
marshal the available facts and their various interpretations. 
Even with these skills, the analysis of Korean economic develop- 
ment largely depends on intuitive insight and interdisciplinary 
sensitivity. It is both an art and a science, and the balance 
between the two is a matter for either dispute or conjecture. 
As one who has been involved in evaluation of development 
activities for many years, I believe that there has always been 
an intellectual gap in the analysis of what a project or a 
program accomplished--between what happened in a country, area, 
or sector, either for its beneficiaries or in the aggregate--and 
the causal connection between the planned activity and the 
changes. So many extraneous, but relevant, factors impinge on 
project results in the nonlaboratory setting in which they exist 
that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, specifically to 
attribute the results to the project, a program in related 
fields, changed government or donor policies, aspects of the 
international economic scene, or a complex combination of these 
factors. 
Demonstrating that growth and, with more difficulty, 
increased equity occurred over a prolonged period is relatively 
easy, but it is infinitely more complex to separate the causal 
connections and virtually impossible meaniagfully to quantify the 
uses of donor funds in isolation from other possible causal 
factors. 
Intellectually the task is difficult, but progress has taken 
place and there has been a generally positive donor record in 
Korea. Observers of the Korean scene perhaps can be satisfied 
with the conclusion that ths "hard numbersn economists desire are 
available only in the aggregate arid that they should not be too 
disheartened. Causality between donor activity and growth can be 
reasonatiy inferied, if not proven. 
For these reasons, this essay is highly personal, not only 
in its interpretation of Korean growth and distribution, but alsc- 
for the implications thet it draws fror Korea that might be 
applicable to other societies. 
I would like to thank both pres2at and past members of the 
Korean Government, including the staffs of the Ministry of 
Finance, the Economic Planning Board, the Bank of Korea, and the 
Korea Development Institute for their kindnesses and assistance. 
I halre refrained from naming individuals here, for the conclu- 
sions are solely those of the author, and errors of fact or 
interpretation should not be attributed to others or their insti- 
tutions. 
I would also lik(3 to thank members of AID'S Center for 
Development Information and Evaluation for reading the early 
drafts of this paper, and John Bennett of the Korea Development 
Institute of America and Paul Kuznets, of Indiana University for 
their extensive commnts on the drafts. They all have 
immeasurably improved it, but are, of course, not responsible 
for any errors or s ns of commission or omission. 
To the Task Force on Concessional Flows, Robert Cassen of 
the University of Sussex, AID, and the World Bank, I offer thanks 
for allowing me to increase my understanding of Korean develop- 
ment. This report was prepared under the auspices of the Task 
Force on Concessional Flows; the field work in Korea was sup- 
ported by the World Bank while the author remained an employee of 
AID. The views expressed herein do not reflect those of aqy 
agency of any government or any donor, multiiateral or bilateral. 
Bethez83l, Maryland 
September 1985 
SUMMARY 
By any performance standard, the Republic of Korea overall 
is justly considered an economic success. The forces that pro- 
duced sustained growth are complex; some are rooted in Korea's 
unique historicaL and cultural milieu, but some lessons may be 
abstracted from the Korean experience. 
Korea emerged from the partition after World War 11 and the 
destruction of the Korean War economically devastated, bereft of 
heavy industries and natural resources--a military and economic 
ward of its principal donor, the United States. In the long run, 
however, its economic disadvantages were offset by noneconomic 
factors--an ethnically homogeneous population, linguistic unity, 
a high value placed on mobility through education, and the prin- 
ciple of a meritocratic state. Although mired in abject poverty, 
its people shared a remarkably equal distribution of the assets 
that remained because oZ the land reform inaugurated by the U.S. 
military government, the material destruction of the war, and the 
spread of primary education. 
Korea followed a policy of import svbstitution until i961. 
Almost completely dependent on donor support for food and con- 
sumption goods, as well as raw materials and military assistance, 
Korean policy stressed the maximization of foreign assistance, 
including an unrealistic set of foreign 2xchange rates that 
effectively discouraged exports. Charges that docor support was 
concentrated on consumption goods and that the PL 480 food import 
program retarded realistic agricultural pricing policies were 
generally accurate, as the policy goals of donor and recipient 
were different. 
Following the military coup of 1961, President Park inter- 
nally cxmsolidateJ and centralized economic and political power; 
externally, he shifted economic policy to an exp~rt promotion 
program, perhaps because he was unsure of continuing U.S. sup- 
port. Park did this partly because import substitution had 
obviously failed and he owed nothing to the interests supporting 
that program, and in part to distance his Government from the 
United States. Donor support was diversified, with normalization 
of relations with Japan a critical element in the introduction of 
capital and technology. Foreign investment was encouraged, the 
first IBRD loan signed, and export targets rigorously set and 
meticulously el-forced. President park's concentration on the 
economy, which he was able to control through administrative, 
political, and social means, as well as through taxes and a 
Government allocation of institutional credit, became exceedi-,gly 
effective as te seemed to regard it as his avenue to political 
leqiti~~dcy. Growth of Korean CNP, exports, overseas construction 
earnings, and manufacturing capacity has since attracted the 
admiration of foreign observers, especially cjiven Korea's d e f t  
handling of the crises associated with the two oil price in- 
creases, a worldwide recession, and a large defense burden. 
Although relatively favorable, income distribution worsened 
as the Government virtually ignored the rural sector until the 
early 1970s. Figures on income distribution in Korea are badly 
flawed, as they are in many countries. They show, however, that 
the creation of urban employment in manufacturing, followed by 
later subsidies and development in agriculture, lowered the per- 
centage of the population in poverty from 40 to 10 percent. 
Tncome disparities are likely to grow with the elimination of 
pricing subsidies. 
Equity in Korean society was greatly enhanced by the crsa- 
tion of employment opportunities, a process in which donor sup- 
port was an important but unquantifiable factor, There exist, 
however, important rural and urban income disparities and re- 
gional income differentials. Equal access to the marketplace is 
lacking as the Government has control of institutional credit and 
allocates it largely to the successful major industrial and 
trading conglomerates, because they are easier to work with in 
achieving Government targets, such as those in heavy industry. 
Women are denied equal pay and status in the development process; 
labor is suppressed. 
The importacce and effectiveness of the donor role have 
shifted over time. For the first decade and a half after libera- 
tion, donar (predominantly U.S.) support was essential to the 
survival of the state and the modest growth that took place. 
This support was eminently successful in land reform, although it 
never reached its full potential, as payments to landlords were 
not used productively to their capacity. Acrimonious disputes 
between donor and recipient marked economic policy negotiations 
in the earlier period. 
The increasing success of the Korean export drive under 
President Park encouraged comercial lending and foreign invest- 
ment, so that concessional assistance became extremely modest. 
The role of multinational lendiqg to Korea is considered Sy the 
Government to be an important attraction for commercial lenders. 
There is general agreement that since the early 1960s Korea 
has been an effective user of concessional assistance, by any 
definition of the term. Foreign assistance has been of varying 
importance and impaet in different fields. 
Policy advice was generally followed if it was seen as serv- 
ing Korean interests and supported the distribution of power and 
the national directions already determined by government. It was 
particularly effective when it was viewed as having been 
- ix- 
internally generated and was used by one part of the Korean 
Government to strengthen its views in relation to other govern- 
mental entities. 
Technical assistance personnel, despite problems of language 
and knowledge of the bureaucratic culture, could be effective if 
they provided the technical means by which to implement effec- 
tively the predetermined policy directions of the Government. 
Training and toinan resource development were universally regarded 
as effective and one of the most important elements of conces- 
sional aid. 
Donor support has generally followed Korean Government 
policies and priorities. Emphases have changed as Government 
priorities have shifted, but (with few exceptions) donors have 
followed the Government's lead. Aid levels in the Korean context 
have had little correlation with the affectiveness of foreign 
assistance. 
Korea is not a simple model that can be emulated by other 
nations, But it has been a model user of foreign assistance. 
There are, however, lessons from the Korean experience. Although 
multilateral aid agencies have an edge in both prestige and 
flexibility over major bilateral donors, there is need for refcrm 
in both camps. The search for universal solutions to problems 
that may be specific continues to plague both types of donors. 
ADB - Asian Development Bank 
5E!zQ - market town 
9 E  - county 
hangul - Korean alphabet 
hanja - Chinese characters 
IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(World Bank) 
IDA - International Development Association (World Bank 
Grous) 
ILO - International Labor Organization 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
Saemaul - New Community Movement 
UNDP - United Nations Development Program 
VAT - value-added tax 
yangban - gentry 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Korea has been widely recognized both publicly and pro- 
fessionally for its economic accomplishments, Some more popular 
observers have likened the rapid, indeed spectacular, growth of 
the Korean economy in the past two decades to the rebirth of the 
phoenix from the ashes and destruction of the Korean War, or have 
alluded to the "miracle on the Han."l Others, more academic, 
stress the continuity of the Korean tradition, noting that vari- 
ous policies and personalities helped unleash Korea's poten- 
tial.2 Certainly, development economists and specialists regard 
Korea's national economic performance as one of the worid's 
outstanding successes. There is no dispute over its sustained 
and high gro~th for over two decades against overwhelming odds: 
political turmoil; heavy defense burdens, international insecur- 
ity; the world's third highest population-to-land ratio; and the 
highest per capita-to-farm-land ratio in the world, excluding the 
city states like Singapore.3 
1.1 Background 
The Korean development experience poses not so much the 
broad issue of what happened, on which there is general 
agreement,l but rather (a) why and how it happened; (b) whether 
the sweeping generalizations of remarkable macroeconomic devel- 
opmental success reflect or mask important differences below the 
national level; ( c )  the role of foreign aid agencies, multila- 
teral and bilateral, in this process; and (dl most critical, 
because development is abo7>t people, what specifically happened 
to the people of Korea in this rush to succeed. There may also 
l ~ o r  example, see Michael Koen, Korean Phoenix: A Nation From 
the Ashes (Englewood:  renti ice all International, 1977) ; or 
Jon Woronoff, Korea's Economy: Man-Made Miracle (Arch Cape, 
Oregon: Pace sternational Research, 1983). 
2 ~ h e  10 volumes of the Harvard University Press "Studies on the 
Modernization of the Republic of Korea 1945-1975" generally fall 
into this category. 
3~dward Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the 
Republic of Korea (cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19801, 
p. 226. 
4~ven the generally critical economists with dependency theory or 
class concerns would admit the record on overall growth, although 
they would question the orientation and the price exacted. 
be important lessons, extrapolating from the available Korean 
evidence, applicable to other nations aspiring to similar goals. 
Analysis of the operating principles and methods of the various 
donors might also lead to recommendations on promoting their 
efficacy . 
This essay, then, must be concerned with all of these 
issues, but it is particularly focused on the role that foreign 
concessional assistance, multilateral and bilateral, played in 
this process. It will analyze the growth of the Korean economy, 
especially in the context of a remarkable shift in development 
strategy beginning in 1961, one that has been characterized as 
"perhaps the most dramatic and vivid [policy] change that has 
come about in any developing country since World War II."5 
Within this context, it will explore the issue of distribution or 
equity in Korean society, a question on which existing data are 
far less reliable than those on growth. To understand the criti- 
cal developmental policy shifts in Korea, their historical con- 
text must first be examined. 
Within this broad ken, an analysis of the role and benefits 
accruing to women; the place of the private sector in Korean 
development; the role of trade; how policies were formulated and 
the influence, if any, of foreign assistance agencies on them; 
and the efficacy of technical cooperation or assistance within 
the Korean context will also be examined. The growth of Korea 
has been mirrored in the growth of literature on Korean develop- 
ment, but this essay will not attempt to reproduce or summarize 
this vast corpus of material. Rather, it will focus on the 
effectiveness of foreign assistance in meeting the broad growth 
and equity targets generally of concern tc the four major donors 
to Korea: the World Bank the Asian Development Bank ( A D B ) ,  the 
United States, and ~ a ~ a n . ~  The economic influence of each of 
these donors has differed over time, with the United States no 
longer providing major assistance to Korea. 7 
S~nne Krueger, The Development of the Foreign Sector and Aid 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19771, p. 82. 
60ther donors have been relatively minor. The UN has provided 
continuous assistance, but for a period that support was coor- 
dinated through the UN Command, which was American eontrolled. 
Levels of support through the UN Development Program ran between 
$3 and 4 million per year from 1979 to the present. The Federal 
Republic of Germany has provided $300 million in support since 
1961. 
7~~~ country support ceased in 1975, but AID, through private and 
voluntary agencies and through the "American Schools and 
Hospitals Abroadm program, has provided modest assistance. 
The complexity of the Korean development process, as docu- 
mented in the Surgeonicg literature on the subject, precludes the 
narrow interpretation that the forces leading to such rapid 
growth were solely the result of textbook-like economic factors. 
The diverse pressures shaping Korean econonic expansion require a 
politico-economic analysis, with additional consideration of its 
sociocultural background, although development agencies prefer to 
use quantifiable economic indicators. 
As one suthor noted: 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, given the complex- 
ity of relationships and the obvious influence of 
institutional and cultural factors tnat economists 
treat 'government' as exogenous and that neither econo- 
mists nor political scientists have a paradigm that can 
satisfactorily explain how the regime or government 
influences economic development. 8 
Although donors may wish to eschew political factors in 
providing assistance, and this is especially important for 
maltilateral agencies, understanding the political and social 
forces that shape economic policy and development is quite 
separate from providing assistance because of such factors. It 
is the former that is of concern here, for if lessons are to be 
learned from the Korean development process, they will only be 
applicable if they relate to the noneconomic forces in other 
societies. 
1.2 On Folklore and Definitions 
A wide range of quasi-informed development folklore has 
evolved and been articulated about Korean growth. These views, 
often expressed at high academic or government levels, tend to 
obscure those elements of accuracy included in such sweeping 
generalizations as those suggesting that the causes of Korean 
growth are solely or essentially rooted in the efficacy of the 
private sector, a Confucian or "post-Confucian" society,g strong 
authoritarian leadership, pricing or exchange rate policies, or 
are only attributable to the success of foreign assistance, a 
desideratum devoutly to be wished by some staff of donor organi- 
zations. 
8~aul Kuznets, "The South Korean Model of Political and Economic 
Development: Economic Aspects," Mimeographed, November 1983 
p. 36. 
9~oderiek MacFarquhar, "The Post-Confucian Threat to the West," 
Economist, February 8, 1980. 
One authority on Korea, in an exuberance of enthusiasm, 
could write, "The almost irresistible conslusion from Korean 
development experience is that with proper economic policies and 
a continuation of reasonable international aid levels most devel- 
oping countries can achieve at least a 6 percent annual growth 
rate, and many countries could sustain growth rates as high as 10 
percent."lO Worldwide experience since that time would chal- 
lenge this lesson as negiscting other, important factors in the 
Korean experience. 
The task of a,lalysis is further complicated by the absence 
of clear, distinct ;'efinitions, including those as fundamental to 
this study as econom~c assistance, concessionality, and effec- 
tiveness, the last of which will be defined subsequently. Aid 
(as distinct from commercial credits) from all sources to Korea 
since liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 to 1983 has 
probably totaled over $26 billion,ll much of it in grant or con- 
cessional form. About one-third of this amount was military 
assistance. From 1962 until 1981, Korea received $41.7 billion 
in foreiqn lending and grants, of which one-third came from 
public and two-thirds from commercial sources.12 Even this 
figure seems low, because it approximated Korea's external debt 
in 1981 and most assistance before 1962 was in grant form. 
IP considering the role of foreign aid, how d0e.s one calcu- 
late or account for any influence of military assistance in eco- 
nomic development? Although some forms of military support can 
be excluded from any economic analysis, there are other forms 
that are more ambiguous. The training of thousands of military 
officers in the United States may have had a significant impact 
on these individuals when they left the services and assumed 
important roles in the civilian government and economy. The 
early supply of skilled labor, such as electricians and mechan- 
ics, came from the military. Social mobility in Korea in the 
l0~ilbert Brown, p. 265, as quoted in Mason et al., p. 471. Mason 
et al. also dismiss the sweeping generalization of this posi- 
tion, although admitting the importance of sound policies. 
ll~otal assistance is calculated as follows: 
U.S. $13.8 billion 
IBRD 5.3 billion (through 3/84) 
Japan 4.5 billion (through 1983) 
ADB 1.4 billion (through 1981) 
Other (Germany, UNDP, voluntary agencies, etc.) 
1.0 billion (estimate) 
12~sian Development Bank, Study of the Bank's Operational Priori- 
ties and Plans for the 19808s, Korea Country study, August 198;E 
past two decades has been possible through the military. Large 
quantities of surplus U.S. military equipment had economic 
impacts. The role of the Korean military and foreign military 
aid was gervasive and affected the economy in ways not adequately 
defined. How important the military experience of working within 
a strong hierarchical command structure was for effective imple- 
mentation of developmental projects, a hallmark of the successful 
Kcrean experience, deserves consideratic?. So too the effects of 
military mobilization are important in analyses of labor supply 
and employment issues. An assessment of military assistance is 
not included in this paper: its importance merits and awaits 
careful study. 
How also does one account for the important effects of the 
Vietnam War on the Korean economy and its foreign exchange 
holdings at that time, as well as in the training of an overseas 
construction icdustry that was later to play such a vital role in 
the Middle East and elsewhere (about $13 billion in 1981 and 
198213 Can Japanese "reparations" be considered as concessional 
assistance? How do we calculate or evaluate the contributions of 
the relief and developmental operations of literally hundreds of 
voluntary organizations and foundations that assisted Korea? 
These issues are not resolved here, although their importance 
should not be overlooked or underestimated. 
Llthough it is likely that the real (as opposed to nominal) 
value of foreign concessional assistance, especially in the 
earlier period, may well have been overestimated,l3 from the 
United States alone Korea received more assistance per capita 
than any other country in the world except Israel and Vietnam. 
This assistance was even more important in the 1950s because of 
the absence of other donors, commercial credits, and foreign 
investment, let alone the inflation since that period. 
The definition of the concessionality of foreign aid seems 
to offer less controversy because it ostensibly is determined by 
how many resources must be repaid. It clearly involves interest 
rates below the international market, but may also include long 
repayment schedules and grace periods. It is also evident that 
~concessionality" may be defined by field or sector: commercial 
lending may not be available for certain types of projects (e.g., 
health). The economic returns may not be readily apparent, and 
thus concessional assistance may be appropriate. Concessional 
l 3 ~ e e  Young-iob Chung, "U.S. Economic Aid to South Korea After 
World War 11," in The United States and Korea, Andrew Nahm, ed. 
(Kalamazoo: Western Michiqan University, the Center for Korean 
Studies, 1979). There is hot only the issue of the attribution 
of fureiqn aid, but also the exchange rate(s) at which it was 
calculated. This was a critical, divisive issue in the 1950s. 
assistance thus may transcend the normal InL~rnational Develop- 
ment Association (IDA) context and may also b,? influenced by 
internal factors. Internatiorial market-rate lending to Korea, 
although at times not concessional solely in interest rate terms, 
usually turns out to be so when re-lent internally, at least in 
comparison with the curb or informal market. Because the demand 
for credit exceeds the officially controlled supply and the 
Government has had virtual direction over the institutional cred- 
it mechanisms within Korea, including those originating from 
abroad, credit in chis monopoly situation has tended to be highly 
concessional compared to the informal market and is used to shape 
and direct economic investment. Even institutional rates may 
differ. For example, foreign funds to the Korea Development Bank 
in 1980 were re-lent at 9.1 percent interest, but in the same 
year Government equipment loan interest rates were 21.0 percent. 
In that year, the Medium Industry Bank re-lent foreign funds at 
8.5 >ercent, Korean Government funds at 19.5 percent, and their 
own funds at 24.8 percent.14 The complexity of interest rates 
within the same organization, but reflecting different origins of 
the funds, is also evident in the National Agricultural Coopera- 
tive ~ederatioc -15 The Government uses subsidized interest 
rates to encourage specific exports. Korea continued to borrow 
from IDA as late as 1974, but the bulk of lending tc Korea under 
IBRD auspices was at the prevailing interest rates for middle- 
income countries, although it was somewhat below commercial 
rates. The definition used in this Taper will include such 
lending to Korea but obviously will exclude loans from private 
commercial banks and commercial investment. 
This paper is divided into considerations of the two main 
analytical elements of the study: growth and equity or distribu- 
tion. This division allows the paper to be more focused than a 
straight historical analysis. Aid effectiveness issues that cut 
across these two aspects of the report will be treated toward the 
close of the paper in a separate section. 
14~eroy Jones, Jae-Bul and the Concentration of Economic Power in 
Korean ~evel~pn&t: Issues, Evidence and Alternatives, Con- 
- 
sultant Paper Series No. 12 (Seoul: Korea Develo~ment Institute. 
July 1980 1 ,  p .  92. Multiple interest rates depenhing on the 
source of funds have been a common characteristic of Korean 
institutions. Also see David I. Steinberg et al,, Korean Agri- 
cultural Services: The Invisible Hand in the Iron Glove. 
Market agd Nonmarket Forces in Korean Rural Development AID 
Project Impact Evaluation No. 52 (Washinston. DC: AID. March 
l5~ee Steinberg et al., Korean Agricultural Services. 
1.2.1 Growth 
Growth is defined for purposes of this paper as the expan- 
sion of the gross national product in real terms in the aggregate 
afid on a per capita basis. Growth does not necessarily imply 
self-sustaining expansion of the economy, and thus development. 
Growth also subsumes the increases in t.he productivity of land, 
labor, and capital, as well as the mobilization of savings for 
investment. It also includes the allocatiori of these resources 
and the capacity of the society to invest and manage such alloca- 
tions and production. Entrepreneurship is thus one element of 
the growth process. Growth is also concerned with the increases 
in the rates and types of technological change, and it must also 
include discussion of the capacity of the state to generate 
foreign exchange and the volume and changes in the composition 
and direction of trade. 
The reliability of the figures on aggregate growth in the 
Korean society is relatively good in comparison with other 
nations. Although there are some gaps, inadequacies, and incon- 
sistencies, and entrepreneurial and managerial functions can 
hardly be quantified, a clear picture of Korea's overall accom- 
plishments is possible. 
1.2.2 Equity 
Growth deals with aggregate figures; equity disaggregates 
those figures in various ways. Equity is distribution, but 
distribution that transcends funds and also includes other fac- 
tors. Equity in development terms may be defined as partici- 
sation in and the shared access to the resources, benefits, deci- 
sions, and costs associated with the development process in eco- 
nomic, social, and cultural spheres, and the potential mobility 
to partake of social and economic change. Equity developmentally 
is not necessarily equality, but is more akin to an admittedly 
ill-defined concept of 'fairness." Equity is thus not simply 
limited to aspects of income distribution, although in many 
societies income is its most obvious manifestation and in devel- 
opment agencies the normal focus of inquiry, when it is con- 
sidered at all. Income is, after all, only one aspect of that 
which is distributed. 
Perhaps more important than the rather static data that 
analysis of the income of various deciles of the population or 
Gini coefficients provide at any single point are such issues as 
(a) under what conditions can income be enhanced (and who has 
control over those conditions if they exist); (b) what types of 
social and economic mobility exist in that society and are they 
increasing; and t c )  how much and what kind of access do indivi- 
duals have to the social services generally subsumed by the 
rubric of basic human needs? 
These issues are pcsitively phrased. The converse must also 
be explored: who benefited less or sacrificed more for growth in 
the society? Any analysis must also determine not only who gets 
how much out of growth, but what the obstacles are to shared 
access and whether such deterrents are increasing or diminishing. 
For this paper, che issue of the donors' roles, if any, are par-. 
ticularly important. 
Social issues are salient as well: to what degree has there 
been equal access to critical services, such as education or 
health or amenities such as eiectricity, and what role has the 
government played (or not played) to ensure that these services 
were equally available in some appropriate manner? Did, for 
example, agricultural extension workers provide broad regional 
and farm coverage? Was fertilizer available to all? 
An issue not normally discussed in economic papers is that 
of soc:al mobility: can one rise by both income and class 
(stat~s or prestige) within the society and through what means? 
Equity in sum is related both to economic and social reality and 
to hope as well; it is both fact and perception. All of these 
questions are relevant to Korea and will be treated, if only 
briefly, below. 
We will consider in this paper several aspects of equity: 
income distribution as disaggregated by income decile (the most 
traditional method for viewing equity), by urban and rural dif- 
ferentiation, and by geographic region. Differences, if any, 
between income distribution within the urban sector, such as in 
various types of manufacturing and between manufacturing and the 
service sector, and by sex within each category, might also be 
informative. 
If there are no important ethnic distinctions in Korea, 
there are vital regional differences, the origins of which go 
back over 1500 years and the saliency of which remains both eco- 
nomically and politically evident today. The general avail- 
ability of employment (and its possibility by region, sex, and 
training) is one other aspect of equity, as is accesc+ to such 
jobs and the means to acquire the skills necessary to qualify for 
such a~tivities. Equity should also be viewed in terms of access 
to the market; that is, is the market reasonably accessible to 
all, and if credit or other incentives are provided, especially 
by the state, is there discrimination in their allocation? 
Further, if the government sets prices for producers or con- 
sumers, who secures the benefits or shoulders the burdens? If 
there are subsidies involved, how are they accounted for and who 
immediately or eventually pays the bill? The final economic 
issue concerns the equitable sharing of the costs of running the 
state--how is the tax burden allocated? 
Factors in Korean Growth and Equity 
Korea had several important advantages that, in retrospect, 
were critical to both the growth of the economy and the distribu- 
tive patterns related to such economic changes. Although they 
are not necessary and sufficient preconditions of rapid develop- 
ment, and few observers were ~rescient enough to anticipate their 
relevance, the Korean experience indicates that these advantages 
may have accelerated the process. 
1.3.1 - Ethnicity and Culture 
Korea's singular advantage over many other societies, one 
that has important implications for both growth and equity, is 
that Korea is the only country in Asia, and one of the few devel- 
oping countries in the worlC, that is essentially ethnically 
h0mo~eneous.~6 Over the ceaturies, Korea has evolved into a 
society in which there are no significant minority groups that 
have traditionally been disadvsntaged,17 no groups that have 
been cast outside the mainstrea~z cZ the society. Conversely, 
there were no different peoples who developed a commanding or 
exploitative economic or social role. There were, thus,. no eth- 
nic impediments to economic development or the distribution of 
its fruits, and no ethnic scores that had, in nationalistic 
terms, to be settled. Korea fortuitously avoided the dilemma of 
having to address the equivalent of the Indians in Burma, the 
Chinese in Indonesia, or the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The colonial 
Japanese were repatriated by an occupying military power, the 
United States, and quickly vanished from the internal economic 
scene. 
l6This is an overly simplistic definition of ethnicity, which may 
shift with time and circumstances. For this analysis, however, 
it is essentially accurate. There is, of course, a large body of 
literature on this subject regarding individual developing 
societies but, significantly, little on Korea internally. 
17The only minority group was the Chinese, who in the 1960s num- 
bered some 22,000-25,000. They were from Shantung Province and 
were significant neither economically nor socially. There are 
considerably fewer left because of emigration. Even Japan, eon- 
sidered comparatively homogeneous ethnically, has its eta and 
Ainu populations and its Korean and Chinese minorities. 
This single ethnicity has mesnt that education could be 
focused and the population mobilized with relative ease. There 
were no insuperable problems of linguistic diversity that retard- 
ed advancement through education in a national language that, 
because it had been suppressed by the colonial power, acquired 
added piquancy, or indeed the universal and rapid expansion of 
eeucation throughout the state, with important im~lications for 
the future mobilization of labor for industrial development. 
Regional accents in Korea are more a cause for humor than for 
rancor. 
An obverse developmental hypothesis based on Korea may thus 
be formulated: countries that have ethnically diverse popula- 
tions will probably find economic growth with equity more dif- 
ficv~lt to achieve, manage, and sustain. In such circumstances, 
donors will have to be sensitive (with resultant staffing impli- 
cations) to the nuances of working with a central government to 
affect positively, or disadvantage as little as possible, ethnic 
groups on the periphery. The balance between ethnicity and 
distributional economics is indeed often delicate, 
Korea's comparative developmental advantage extends to many 
other, related areas. There have been no vituperative religious 
splits in Korea that have proven economically or socially divi- 
sive, and there has been none of the religious conservatism that 
has militated against change, economic or social, in other 
societies. Christianity (both Protestantism and Catholicism) has 
been an important indicator, but not determining element, of 
change. Its growth has mirrored Korea's economic expansion, 
although a causal relationship between the two is not demonstra- 
ble. 
Ethnic cohesion toward the external world, despite extreme 
internal factionalism, has been characteristic of Korea for a 
thousand years. In the face of external cultural threats from 
its neighbors, Koreans have shared a strong sense of "Korean- 
ness," which has given them relative cultural cohesion. This has 
had important developmental and mobilization implications when 
Korea has been externally threatened. 
The ardent desire for reunification between North and South 
Korea is one obvious manifestation of this basic cultural unity. 
Yet the perceived military threat from North Korea has given 
substantial impetus toward attainment of both the growth and 
equity goals of the Republic. In some sense, the large military 
expenditures, one-third of the budget and up to 6.5 percent of 
GNP ,la and the continued mobilizatios of the fifth largest 
standing army in the world are in part offset by the drive to 
1hason et al., p. 184. 
achieve the political goal of succeeding economically, and to do 
so equitably, 
Three other factors have been critical in promoting longer 
term, relatively equitable economic growth. These are land 
reform throughout the Republic; equal social, physical, and 
gender access to primary education; and a meritocratic gcvernment 
service (and similar employment in many quasi-governmental insti- 
tutions, such as banks), the primary access to which was through 
an impartial examination system. The first two items were 
assisted by foreign donors, and the last is a coiitribution to 
world culture through the Confucian-oriented state, reinforced by 
contemporary western values. 
1.3.2 Land Reform 
Foreign assistance began in 1945 with the liberation of 
Korea from its colonial master, Japan. The U.S. military govsT:n- 
ment, prior to the formation of the First Korean Republic in 
1948, had initiated two processes that were based on policy deci- 
sions inspired from abroad. They were, in fact, fundamentally 
different, for example, from the relief assistance provided or 
fertilizer imported; the former was transitory and the latter 
simply the logical extension of the modernization process begun 
under the Japanese. Both processes were also well received 
internally and were to have profound effects on Korea that con- 
tinue to the present. 
Of fundamental importance was land reform, a two-stage 
operation, the first step of which was to distribute to the 
Korean farmers land that had been under Japanese control or 
ownership. This has been called "without doubt, the most signi- 
f icant accomplishment of the U.S. Military ~overnment. "19 The 
second stage, which was completed after the armistice following 
the Korean War, broke up the larger Korean an ban (gentry) es- %- tates, leaving Korea with a relatively equita le rural income 
distribution pattern. A limit of 3 hectares was set for owner- 
ship of agricultural land. Full ownership was only 13.8 percent 
in 1945, but 73.6 percent in 1 9 6 0 . ~ ~  
Although land ownership had strong emotional underpinnings 
in Korean society, the value of agricultural land was very low 
Z00n land reform, see, for e~ample, Choi Moon Hwan, "A ~eview of 
Korea's Land Ref~rrn,~ torcana Quarterly, Spring 1960; and Mason 
et al., Chapter 7. 
because Government prices for rice were essentially below the 
costs of production, a situation allowed to continue because of a 
massive U.S. food import program.21 Thus, investaent in rural 
real estate was not economically sound until the 1970s, and land 
reform met with little major opposition. Although an erosion of 
owner-operated farms and a perceptible rise in tenancy have 
occurred since the reform, as well as pressures to raise or eli- 
minate the ceiling on land ownership to make mechanization more 
feasible and thus increase the productivity of labor, Korea's 
relatively egalitarian rural income figures (however flawed) 
today still reflect this positive policy shift. 
In economic terms, the land reforms probably lowered produc- 
tion for a short period as the state could not efficiently 
replace the support provided by the landlords in supplying seed, 
fertilizer, and credit. In the longer term, however, it prompted 
aspiring mobile people to move to urban areas, induced investment 
in urban endeavors, politically placated the rural population, 
and may have raised farm productivity when pricing and other fac- 
tors were in place. 
The landlords were paid in Government bonds that rapidly 
deteriorated in value. This was, in effect, income redistribu- 
tion, not only land reform, and thus was important for the rela- 
tive equality of income distribution in the highly agrarian 
society that was Korea following liberation.22 Landlords 
retained their social, if not economic, standing, and many of 
them invested their resources in the modern equivalent of the 
imperial examination system of the Yi Dynasty--modern, Western- 
ized education for their children--and urban real estate. 
This reform was inspired from abroad. The examples of the 
American-instituted reforms in Japan and Taiwan were the models, 
but the saliency of the reform was also in part prompted by a 
previous North Korean land reform that politically could not be 
ignored in the South, as well as (in its second phase) by the 
reform effecti~ely crippling Syngman Rhee's yangban - political 
opposition. 
2lsung Hwan Ban et al., Rural Devlogment (Cambridge, Mass. : 
Rarvard University Press, 1980 1 ; and ~a&n et al., p 11. 
22~ason et al., p. 238. In hindsight, of course, it might have 
been better. Payments to landlords could have fueled industrial 
growth, and land fragmentation could have been eliminated, but 
despite these deficiencies, the achievement was noteworthy. 
1.3.3 Education 
The second critical aspect of foreign developmental assis- 
tance was the expansion of the primary educational system, which 
the American military government thought would help "democratizew 
Korea. Exploited by the Japanese and denied access to education 
in Korean, the Koreans had a pent-up demand for education that 
exploded as soon as it was politically feasible. In the closing 
days of the colonial period, even the right to maintain their 
Korean language and names was denied in a Japanese effort to 
integrate Korea into the mainstream of the Japanese Empire--a 
process that can accurately be called attempted cultural geno- 
cide. 
This educational demand, which had its origins in a value 
system heavily dominated by the Confucian concept of the impor- 
tance of learning, was in part met through the rapid construction 
with foreign aid of a primary school system that eventually 
resulted in raising literacy rates to one of the highest levels 
in the newly industrialized nations. Adult literacy was only 22 
percent in preliberation Korea. Today it is over 93 per~ent.~3 
Korea may have the only major army in the world composed com- 
pletely of high school graduates a ~ d  those with higher education. 
By 1969, the average years of schooling of those between 25 and 
34 years of age was higher in Korea than in France or Italy.Z4 
The basic American foreign assistance effort had three 
policy goals: the democratization of education, its decentrali- 
zation, and the creation of coeducational classes to improve the 
status of women. Although the basic objectives of the donor were 
never met (Korean education remains hierarchical, 'democratiza- 
tion" was never achieved, control of the education system is even 
more highly centralized than before, and coeducational classes 
were never accepted beyond the primary level), the educated labor 
force that was created prior to demand emanating from the manu- 
facturing sector was an important element both in Korea's 
growth2S and in the rapidity with which it was accomplished. 
23~avid Cole and Princeton Lyman, Korean Development : - The 
Interplay of Politics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1971). 
2 4 ~ . ~ .  Wade and B . 9 .  Kim, Economic Development in Korea: The 
Political Economy of Success, Hew York, Praeger, 19771, p. 125. 
25tdoel McGinn et al., Education and Development in Korea 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980); also Mason 
et al., Chapter 10. In interviews with key Korean leaders, this 
point was a lietmotif in most discussions. 
Korean growth and development did not create the demand for 
education. Rather, popular demand (somewhat unrealistic in the 
earlier period--Korean education was not known as an ivory tower, 
but a "cow bone tower," a structure built on the sale of cattle 
by farmers to finance their childrens' education) for mobility 
through schooling substantially led any real growth in the econo- 
mic system. As the economy expanded, however, an educated labor 
pool of both men and women wzs available to provide Korea a com- 
petitive edge cver many nations with a less literate and educated 
populace. The Korean Government made attempts to spread the pri- 
mary school system throughout the country. Indeed there were few 
places by the 1960s that did not have a primary school within 
walking distance of most villages; by 1965, 91.6 percent of pri- 
nary school-age students were enrolled .26 Although female par- 
ticipation in education started out quite low, it has now 
equalled that of males, at least at the primary and middle school 
levels, and has virtually done so in high schools. Female 
enrollment ratios in colleges, however, are relatively low (26.5 
percent in 19751, probably because of the high costs and prefer- 
ence given to males. 
Although the Government advocated the establishment of 
schools throughout the country, the level of Government expen- 
diture on education was kept quite low in comparison to other 
countries; since 1960 it has run about 15 percent of the Govern- 
ment budget and under 3 percent of G N P . ~ ~  In fact, the bulk of 
education in Korea was privately financed. The strong desire for 
education is evident from its enormous private fanding; in 1961, 
for example, expenditures on education were estimated to equal 
one-fifth of the currency in circulation.28 Throughout much of 
the decade beginning in 1966, the costs of middle school were 
about 10 percent of disposable household income, high school 15 
percent, an& college one-third.29 In 1977, more than two-thirds 
of total in-school expenditure were borne by parents of middle, 
high school, and college students, and this limited educational 
access.30 Thus, significant sacrifices were made by the popula- 
tion to educate their children. 
26Plc~inn, p. 47, and World Bank 1982. 
28~regory Henderson, Korea: Politics of the Vortex, (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19681, p. 220. 
30~orea Developinent Institute, Develo~ent - Strategy and Pol icy 
Priorities for the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, Working 
Paper No. 8003 (Seoul: Korea Development ~nstituc, April 19801, 
Severe equity problems did and still do exist, however, in 
educ~tional access, particularly at higher levels. Poverty 
retarded educational advancement; through the 1960s, roads and 
transportation in rural areas were so limited that many potential 
students could not go on to middle and high schools, which were 
located only in the market towns (eups). There were no boarding 
facilities there, and it was only the exceptional farm family 
with means or relatives in the towns that could send a child, 
usually male, to middle and high school. 
An important byproduct of the axpansion of Government 
assistance in rural areas beginning in 1971 was the massive 
construction, improvement, paving, and expansion of the rural 
road network. This had important equity and economic implica- 
tions, for (with buses subsidized by the Government along some 
more remote routes) students had better access to schools. The 
IBRD has provided well over $ 3 5 0  million and the ADB over $100 
million for road and highway construction and improvement.31 
Along with the expansion of the rural road system cams the 
increase in farm income because of the change in policy on the 
higher pricing of rice and barley. Thus, funds became available 
for education of children beyond primary school. This meant that 
by the 1970s farm children were attending schools on bicycles 
that previnusly had only been the major mode of transporting pro- 
duce to market. Of course, the expansion of the population in 
middle, high schools, and colleges had important implications for 
restraining the growth of the labor force. 
Because the educational and social system pointed consist- 
ently upward toward a bureaucratic position (today business may 
be even more enticing), there was a persistent demand to get into 
a good primary school, leading to a good middle and high school, 
and then to one of the better universities. This practice 
mirrored the Japanese experience. The system was so accurately 
predictable--good primary schools being the critical first factor 
in social and economic success--that families of civil servants 
or businessmen would often not join their husbands in the provin- 
ces so they might have access to the better schools of Seoul. In 
that sense, most of the rest of Korea was disadvantaged. In 
1975, Seoul, with about 20 percent of the population, had 16.3 
percent of the nation's primary school, 2 0  percent of the middle 
school, 34.2 percent of high school, and 4 2 . 5  percent of college 
graduates; education was an important (but not primary) motiva- 
tion for migration to ~eou1.32 
31~xact figures are not known because highways and roads were 
constructed as components of other projects as well. 
3 2 ~ c ~ i n n  et al., p .  165. 
In a series of recent reforms, the Government has attempted 
to break up these patterns by assigning schools by lottery, eli- 
minating a private tutorial system that favored the children of 
the wealthy elite by allowing them to excel more effectively on 
all types of competitive examinations,33 expanding higher educa- 
tion (and technical schools), and generally breaking down the 
elite, gentry (yangban) tradition in which, parenthetically, most 
of the aray did not participate. Education is expensive in 
Korea, with many of the private costs hidden, and one indicator 
of increasing rural incomes is that many farm families who once 
could send their children only through primary school can now 
send them through middle and high school (whereupon they usually 
abandon the farm for urban employment). The issue of continua- 
tion in school is more important in Korea than in some other 
nations because Korea uses a mix of both the KP .n alphabet 
(hangul) and Chinese characters (hanja--the latter have been eli- 
minated in North Korea). One may be literate in hangul after 
primary school, but one cannot read Korean newspapers, which are 
printed in the two alphabets, because Chinese characters are not 
introduced until late in primary education. Thus, to function 
effectively in Korean society requires at least a middle school 
education. 
1.3.4 The Meritocratic State 
For the generation now in power, the social contacts 
established through the "right" education were an integral part 
of success, if one could pass through the stiff entrance require- 
ments of the meritocracy. 
The Confucian state originated the concept of a bureaucratic 
meritocracy through instituting an examination system for govern- 
ment positions. It is not surprising that Korea, a state even 
today with strong Confucian overtones, should have adapted the 
concept to its own use. 
3 3 ~ o r  example, it was estimated that 70 million won was spent 
annually on private tutoring, and this gave students who could 
afford it an advantage. About 14 percent of students attending 
college had tutors, and in large cities 12.2 percent of students 
had tutors, compared with only 1.5 percent of those in rural 
areas. Per capita costs at the high school level were W15,813 
per month. See Hans Singer and Nancy Baster, Young Human 
Resources in Korea's Social Development: Issues and Strategies 
(Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 19801, p. 31. The ability 
to tutor was an income supplement for needy college students. 
Some cynics note that making tutoring illegal means group 
tutoring is eliminated but private tutoring is not, thus in fact 
raising costs. 
Initial entry into the bureaucratic system through examina- 
tion tends to perpetuate or ratify the existing social order. 
Although, theoretically, anyone can pass, in fact those who grad- 
uate from the better universities, and those who enter those uni- 
versities from the better high schools, are chosen on merit. 
These students are a self-perpetuating intellectual elite who can 
be said to be "the best and the brightest," often the scions of 
well-known families who have maintained their social (and econo- 
mic) standing by ensuring that their children remain at the apex 
of society. 
This is not to say that Korea, as nany other societies, does 
not also operate on the "entourage" system associated with patri- 
monial societies,34 but the merit system as a means of initial 
entry is pronounced and respected. The depth of bureaucratic 
competence extending down through the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and the various sectoral ministries to the county (gun) is evi- 
dent in the effective project implementation to which every donor 
attests. It has been an integral feature of both growth and 
equity . 
These three elements of land reform, educational expansion, 
and a meritocracy, some of which are shared with other states, 
eventually more than compensated for the natural resources, the 
heavy industry and mineral wealth, and the hydroelectric power 
plants that in 1945 had been North Korea's portion on partition. 
They are not sufficient explanations for Korea's economic 
progress, but they were integral to it. They were, in part, 
assisted by foreign aid. 
2. KOREAN GROWTH 
Korean growth has been neither continuous nor sectorally 
balanced since the Korean War. To gain perspective on changes 
that occurred in different periods, it is important first to pro- 
vide an overview of Korea's economic development. 
2.1 Economic Accomplishments of the Republic of Korea, 1953-1983 
In 1953, Korea was in ruins. The destruction caused by the 
Korean War devastated the society and the economy, only physi- 
cally sparing a small segment of the southeast, which was swollen 
with refugees. No one was emotionally spared. There were over a 
34~ee Norman Jacobs, The Korean Road to Modernization and Devel- 
opment (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985). 
million civilian casualties in South Korea alone, and an addi- 
tional 120,000, mostly South Korean, dead among the UN forces.35 
The destruction caused by the war in South Korea alone was esti- 
mated at $2 billion and included two-thirds of all industrial 
plants and 40 percent of all buildings. The physical losses were 
estimated at just under the equivalent of the total 1953 G N P . ~ ~  
Agricultural production had dropped 27 percent. Twenty-five per- 
cent of the population were refugees. 
The Republic of Korea could not have survived on its own at 
that time. It could neither feed its people nor provide them 
with basic necessities; it could not run the Government witnout 
outside assistance, nor could it protect the state. The standard 
of living had dropped below World War I1 levels and was not to 
equal them again until 1957. Urban degradation and the "spring 
hunger" of the countryside were the pattern, not the exception. 
Korea had become, both militarily and economically, a ward af its 
principal donor--the United States. 
Per capita annual income of the population of 21 million at 
this time was about $67 in current dollars (see Table 1). Less 
than 23 percent of the population was urban. Infant mortality 
was X i 2  per thouzmd live births, and life expectancy was about 
53 years. About 74 percent of the labor force was in agri- 
culture, and only 7 percent in industry. Exports in 1955 were 
only about $18 nillion, mostly consisting of sales to UN forces 
in K~rea, and only about 8 . 3  percent was manufactured goods. 
Rice production was 3 . 7  million metric tons. 
There was, perhaps more importantly, a widespread malaise in 
this fractured society, reflected in an essentially defeatist 
attitude. Korea, it was said, could not he economically self- 
supporting. This pessimism was to last for another decade and 
was to influence both the donors and recipients for a consider- 
able time. Even the most optimistic of reports, that done by 
Robert R. Nathan Associates in 1953 under UN auspices, called for 
concentration on agriculture and mining (not manufacturing) to 
achieve self-sufficiency in 5 years. The plan proved to be un- 
workable within the period set, and later Korea was to follow a 
different route to development. 37 
35paul Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of 
--- 
Korea (New ~ ? ~ e n ;  ~ale7niversit~ Press, 19771, p. 37. 
37~ason et al., p. 179. 
Table 1. Statistical Indic~tors for Korea 1953, 1961, 1970, and 1982 
Category 1953 1961 1970 1982 
Population (inillion) 21.016 25.710 32.241 38.876(1981) 
Percent Urban 23.1 28.6 40.7 55.9(1981) 
Crcde Live Birth Rate 45.3(1958) 41.3 30.3 24.0(1980) 
Infant Mortality 
(per 1000 112.7 75.3 50 .O 33.1(1981) 
Life Expectancy 53.2(1958) 55.0 60.3 66 .1(198!. 1 
Agricultural Labor 
Force ( % I  74.1 64.1 50 .O 34.0(1980) 
Industrial Labor 
Force ( % I  7.0 9.6 18.0 9.0 (1980) 
Vocational School 
Enrollment (000) N/'A 119.3 272.7 805.3(1979) 
Agricultural Production - 
Index 10 1, 70.0 99.0 159.0(1981) 
Production, Wheat (M/T)  10 1 172 219 66 
Production, Rice (M/T) 3,744 4,717 5,471 7,083 
Production, Barley (M/T) 794 1,197 1,591 745 
Imports ( $  million) 345.4 316.1 1,984.0 24,344.6(1981) 
Exports ( $  million) 39.6 40.9 835.2 21,188.9(1981) 
GNP per Capita ( $ 1  67.0 82.0 248.0 1,800.C 
Domestic Savings as 8.0 15.6 29.3 
% of GNP (1962-1966) (1967-1971) (1977-1978) 
Manufacturing as % 8.3 13.9 77.1 9 0 
of Exports (69) 
Source: Derived from IBRD data. 
On the coup of General Park Chung Hee in 1961, Korea had not 
greatly changed from 1953. It was true that per capita income 
had increased and infant mortality had started a precipitous 
decline, but the nation still depended on foreign assistance for 
its imports and for a large, but falling, percentage of support 
to the Government's budget. Exports had marginally improved to 
$40.9 million, but manufactured products atill comprised only 
13.9 percent of that total. 
The significance of the shift in politics was, however, soon 
evident as Korea came to be ruled by "military, bureaucratic- 
authoritarian regimes. "38 With this change came vital decisions 
38~uznets, "South Korean Model," p. 39. 
about the nature of the international economic relations that 
Korea was to pursue and the type of economy that Korea was to 
have. These changes were palpable, consistent, generally pragma- 
tic, ably implemented, and came at a time when the world economy 
was receptive to an export drive. 
The support of donors, on which Korea had been so heavily 
dependent, continued to be vital for a period, as will be 
demonstrated below, but the nature of the relationships changed. 
The growing economic independence of Korea, desired both by the 
Koreans and by the United States, Lut for different reasons, 
became readily apparent. 
Today, the visitor who had been absent for two decades, 
traveling in almost any portion of the nation, would have dif- 
ficulty recognizing Korea, either urban or rural. The towering 
Seoulscape, changing markedly every few years, is only the most 
obvious aspect of change that is also mirrored in the country- 
side, where forests have been replanted, houses rebuilt, roads 
paved; tnere are few areas of Korea that indeed can any longer be 
called isolated. 
Life now is no doubt generally better. Infant mortality is 
less than one-third of 1953, and life expectancy is up 13 years. 
Korea has become a largely urban and integrated society. Exports 
totaled over $21 billion by 1981. From a society that relied on 
foreign grant assistance to provide at various periods one-third 
of the govern men^ budget, almost total support for its military, 
and up to 85 percent of all imports, Korea has attracted both 
donors and commercial lenders and investors. Whereas in 1953 
there was concern that the state could not support itself, and 
its credit was nil, today a debt burden of $40 billion is not 
regarded as unduly constraining to a nation with the export 
record and potential of Korea. 
The macroeoconomic performance of South Korea has been spec- 
tacular by any standard. GNP has risen an average of 8.3 percent 
from 1962 to 1981. The growth since 1981 has been impressive: 
5.6 in 1982 and 9.3 percent in 1983. Manufacturing since 1961 
has been the strongest sector, and exports have been expanding at 
about 30 percent per year, so that Korea today exports almost 
entirely manufactured products. Almost as important has been the 
breadth of the exports. Even by 1969, Korea had the highest 
export value among middle-income countries of that period, and 
its diversification of exports--some 101 commodities of which 71 
were manufactured and valued at 77.1 percent of total exports-- 
was greater than any other country's in this group except 
~exico.39 In the early 1960s, Korea exported to only 19 
- 
3 9 ~ a d e  and Kim, pp. 122-125. 
countries; in 
areas .a0 
1976, Korean exports reached 175 nations and 
One of the most important changes that has occurred in Korea 
has been the confidence engendered by the Government in both 
planning and execution of development activities. This is in 
marked contrast to the attitude of despair prevalent in the first 
decade after the Korean War. 
This despair was shared by most, if not all, foreign obser- 
vers and technical assistance specialists and seemed justified by 
the generally poor performance that prompted it. If there has 
been a con~istent pattern among foreign professional observers of 
the Korean economy, it has been a major underestimation since 
1963 of the Korean capacity to achieve goals that seemed wildly 
optimistic to those not fully aware of the strength of the Korean 
bureaucratic culture, its capacity for responding to directives, 
and the resiliency and hard work of its talented people. 
The simplistic notion that this remarkable performance was 
one that was consistently measured and balanced over the three 
decades since the Korean War is not only false but dangerously 
misleading, masking problems in growth, changes in policy, and 
uneven distribution of such growth by region and sector over this 
period. To review Korea's economic achievements is thus to 
review these changes, many of which were intimately linked to the 
political process in Korea, the personalities of the leaders, and 
the changing relationships with the donor community. 
2.2 zmport Substitution and Foreiqn Aid Maximization, 1953-1960 
The literature on Korean economic development and foreign 
assistance produced during and following the first decade after 
the outbreak of the Korean War seems a dirge at an economic wake. 
It reflected extreme disillusionment by both Koreans and Ameri- 
cans over their own and each other's performances. Americans 
referred to Korea as having a "mendicant mentality, "41 as the 
latter wanted aid but seemed less interested in development, and 
as a "bottomless pit" into which aid flowed without result. 
The restrained donor skepticism may be summed up by an offi- 
cial U.S. report stating that "accomplishments have been less 
than they otherwise would have been or have cost more than was 
40~ason et al,, pp, 138-139. 
4 1 ~ e e  Hahm Pyong-Choon , "Korea ' s Mendicant Mentality , " - Foreign 
Affairs, October 1964. 
necessary in what we believe is a significant but indeterminate 
measure."42 These documents stress inefficiency, improper use 
of assistance, political interference in economic issues, and 
corruption. On the other hand, later official reports from the 
1960s, after exports began to rise and the economy markedly 
improved, put far less empnasis on inefficiency, and, when criti- 
cal, dealt with a lack of reporting on assistance and manipula- 
tion (use for unintended purposes, but not waste) of funds. 
Congressional findings indicated that Korea lacked tech- 
nically trained manpower, deplored the extent to which the econ- 
omy was dominated by inefficient Government enterprises, noted 
tne extreme concentration of authority for economic decisions in 
the hands of Syngman Rhee, indicated concern that projects were 
chosen for prestige not economic reasons, and noted that ineffec- 
tive measures were taken to discourage speculative trading, col- 
lect taxes, and promote domestic savings. 43 
During his tenure, the personality and emotional predelic- 
tions of President Syngman Rhee had a pervasive influence over 
the economy of South Korea. He refused to accept the division of 
Korea as permanent and was always determined to unify the two 
regimes. He thus was reluctant to establish those industries, 
including power generation and fertilizer plants, that would 
duplicate those in the North under the eventual unified govern- 
ment that he assumed he woul? control. Therefore, economic 
planning by Koreans (as opposed to that of foreign advisers) was 
not formalized until late in his administration. The first 
Three-Year Economic Development Plan was approved by the cabinet 
in January 1960,44 just 3 months before the student revolution 
that forced Rhee into exile. It was only implemented in revised 
form as a 5-year plan after the coup of General Park Chung Hee in 
1961. It may be said that the modest economic growth that took 
place in the Rhee era was the result of large-scale foreign 
assistance rather than implementation of any positive economic 
plan or mobilization of domestic savings--governmental, business, 
or personal. The propensity to save is strongly influenced by 
confidence in both the economy and the society. There was little 
of either during this period. 
42~om~trollor General of the United States, "Audit Report to the 
Congress of the United States: U.S. Assistance Program for 
Korea," (Washington, DC: Genera: .',ccounting Office, June 14, 
1957 [for fiscal years 1954-19561,. 
44~ae-won Lee, "Perspective for Economic Development and Planning 
in South Korea," in Studies in the Developmental Aspects of 
Korea, Andrew Nanm, ed. (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 
1969). 
The economic regime of the First Republic has been charac- 
terized as one of import substitution and the Park and Chun 
governments ones of export promotion. Import substitution and 
export promotion are not, however, opposed in some sort of eco- 
nomic Manichean dualism. Rather, they may be thought of as a 
spectrum along which it is possible to array countries, periods, 
or sectors for emphasis. Thas, although it is substantially 
correct to say that the Rhee period was essentially oriented 
toward the import substitution end of the spectrum, a variety of 
export incentives were promulgated, but with little effect 
because of unrealistic exchange rate polices.45 During the 
export-oriented Park period, the stress on self-sufficiency in 
rice and the development of heavy and defense-related industries 
could be considered as import substitution within a driving 
export emphasis. 
Although a joint economic planning commission was estab- 
lished during the Korean War to coordinate donor-recipient poli- 
cies and to ensure effective use of the multiple resources 
pouring into Korea from various types of American assistance 
(which also generated local currency that was to be programmed 
jointly), the donor-recipient relationship in this period was 
tense and hostile. 46 There were policy discussions, even 
confrontations, but these could hardly be considered "dialogue." 
There developed a complex series of multiple exchange rates that 
were largely overvalued and retarded export development but also 
allowed vast profits to be amassed through their manipulation. 
It was, thus, quicker and easier to profit from speculation and 
influence than through increased production. Rhee's policy seems 
to have been one of maximizing the flows of foreign assistance 
rather than the development of zm autonomous economic system. 
During this period, aside from some modest assistance that 
was brought in through the UN and a large number of private 
assistance organizations, the donor flows were over 90 percent 
from the United States and were in the form of grants. In 
various years during this period, the United States provided a 
third of the total budget for the Government (58.4 percent in 
1956) and up to 85 percent of all imports and 75 percent of total 
fixed capital formation. During 1352-1958, foreign aid and 
relief assistance provided 75 percent of Korea's imports and 8 
percent of GNP. This latter figure could have been twice as 
large, however, according to one source, had the exchange rate 
u e3 in the calculations been realistic.47 Yet policy reforms 
w e . - e  :.nstituted slowly, rarely, and with qreat recrimination. 
Des~ite the massive U.S. assistance, there was little agree- 
ment between the governments on anything beyond the survival of 
the Korean state. Thus, arguments about the level and role of 
foreign assistance were endemic, with the Koreans attempting to 
expand Government activity without indigenous resource mobiliza- 
tion, while the United States was trying to limit both their and 
the Korean Governments ' expenditures. 48 
Syngman Rhee maintained personal control over the economy. 
He demanded that any issues involving changes in the exchange 
rate, relations with Japan, or foreign assistance require his 
personal approval. The dichotomy over the objectives of foreign 
aid is apparent. Rhee wanted to restore destroyed industry, but 
the United States was afraid that the funds might be used for 
political purposes; in addition, such support would take a long 
gestation period to have any effect and would require additional 
local currency, thus implying more aid-funded commodity imports, 
the sale of which generated sach funds. On the other hand, Rhee 
did not want foreign aid concentrated in agriculture because such 
funds could be controlled by local politicians. The foreign 
donor, the United States, had one prime objective: the main- 
tenance of an effective military command at the lowest cost.49 
Thus, there was a difference in goals that led to conflict over 
economic policies and perfoimance. 
For the first 3 years (until 19561, the Koreans dominated, 
but after that the Americans had a stronger influence on the sta- 
bilization program through the threat of substantial drops in 
aid. Yet, "To take the period as a whole, however, it was Rhee 
who called the tune in economic policy. As so often happens, a 
weak regime confronting a strong power was able to use the very 
47~ilbert Brown, -- Korean Pricing Policies and Econonic -- Development 
in the 1960% (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
- 
1974 1 .  
48~ason et al., p. 305. 
49~ersonal interview with a senior official of the Rhee period. 
Rhee wanted t~ distance himself from the United States a n d  pro- 
posed that Korea join the IBRD and IMF in 1953. An American 
representative to the TBRD recommended that Korea first get its 
inflation under control. TRRD lending at that time was on hard 
terms and Korea could not even prepare a loan application. In 
fact, Korea later uscd the U.S. Development Loan Fund as a prac- 
ticing forum for IBRD loan applications. The first IBRD loan was 
for the railroad in 1962. 
weakness to attain most of its ends. Rhee successfully ursued F what might be called a policy of 'coercive deficiency.'" 0 
The major lesson from this period about what is now called 
"policy dialogue" is that there was relatively little successful 
policy intervention by the donor, despite the magnitude of the 
support, In similar situations, when a major bilateral donor is 
providing funds sufficient in theory to influence the policy 
decisions being made in a host government, the diverse reasons 
for such massive support (e.g., political, security, military, 
and so forth) are likely to be highly complex f r m  the donor's 
policy perspective. Thus economic policy issues are caught in a 
complex web of sometimes contradictory policy and bureaucratic 
interests that prevent focused pressures for individual economic 
reforms, 51 because it is likely that military, security, diplo- 
matic, and indeed internal donor political imperatives will take 
precedence. 
The tensions between Korea and the United States were sum- 
marized as follows: 
The Korean government of Syngman Rhee wanted to build a 
modern economy similar to, but independent of, the 
Japanese economy. Their desire was for new factories 
and heavy industry financed through foreign aid having 
little regard for the inflationary impact of the heavy 
investment programs or the longer-run issues of com- 
parative advantage. The United States, on the other 
hand, was concerned about moving the South Korean eco- 
nomy towards self-sufficiency as rapidly as possible 
while holding down the aid requirements and minimizing 
instability and inflation in the process. Thus, there 
was clear disagreement aver the issue of resource mobi- 
lization, with the Korean government wishing to rely 
mainly on external resources, or if necessary on infla- 
tion as a means of mobiliging domestic resources, and 
the American government urging greater Korean efforts 
Sblason, et al., p. 458. 
Sl~his situation was endemic. The General Accounting Office noted 
that a major purpose of program loans to Korea was to encourage 
the Government to meet economic performance targets. Failure to 
meet the stabilization goals, however, did not result in deobli- 
gation of funds and thus was not effective in the policy sense, 
and release of funds was not always tied to achievement of eco- 
nomic goals. (Comptroller General of the United States, "U.S. 
Assistance for the Economic Development of the Republic of 
Korea," Undated draft submitted to AID, [General Accounting 
Office, July 26, 19721, p. 31.) 
at domestic resource mobilization through increased 
taxes and private savings.52 
Severe criticism of the early American aid effort was war- 
ranted and began to surface in print in Korea after the overthrow 
of the Rhee Government. American aid, it was charged, imported 
consumption-type goods and not the basic capital materials needed 
to build a self-sufficient economy. Investment goods were less 
than 14 percent of all imports from 1953 to 1960 and less than 10 
percent in 1953, 1957, and 1958. There was concern that the PL 
480 program was counter-productive in that it allowed the Gov- 
ernment to suppress the producer prices for rice. This criticism 
was later widely echoed. It was also said later that 'This use 
of program loans (in the 1960s) for rice purchases with AID funds 
in conjunction with increased PL 480 imports appears to serve as 
a disincentive for the Korean government to seek an early solu- 
tion to problems in its agriculture sector."53 
Despite the fact that the rural areas were disadvantaged and 
that both the public sector, which the Americans criticized as 
too large (partially because the state took over many of the 
Japanese assets), and the private sector were considered inef- 
ficient, the economy *as by no means stagnant. The agricultural 
sector grew by 4.1 percent during this period, even though rice 
production, the mainstay of the agricultural sector, remained 
relatively constant -54 Even in industry, some observers noted 
that the charge that foreign assistance was not productive in the 
1950s is inaccurate, because many of the earlier projects per- 
mitted the high growth rates of the 196Qs, even though the 
assistance erpetuated poor policies for longer than was 
necessary. 5 0  Yet the aid programs were wmaintenance-typem acti- 
vities, largely conservative rather than more risk programs 
'aimed at remodeling and rebuilding the society. n 5 f  
During the post-Korean War period of the Rhee Government, 
the magnitude of assistance was so great and pervasive, and Korea 
52fiason et al., pp. 192-193. 
53~omptrollor General of the United States, U.S. Assistance, p. 2. 
5 4 ~ . ~ .  Department of Agriculture. 
5 S ~ n n e  0. Krueger and Vernon W. Ruttan, The Development Impact of 
Economic Assistance to LD* (University of Minnesota, March 
1983). 
5 6 ~ u k  Tai Suh, Foreign Aid Forei~n Capital Inflows and Industrial- 
ization in Korea: 1945-75, (~eoul: Korea Development Institute, 
October 19771, p. 111-37. 
was exporting so little, that almost all of the savings generated 
from foreign sources may be attributed to foreign aid. From 1953 
to 1961, this ranged from a low of 5.2 percent to a high of 10.8 
percent of GNP (average, 8 percent of GNP). During the same 
period, Government savings were negative, ranging from a low of 
-1.7 percent to a high of -3.0 percent of GNP.57 Foreign 
assistance amounted to "more than haif the total resources 
available for capital accumulation in every year from 1955 to 
1962." The critical role of foreign assistance at that time is 
thus apparent. 
One may sum up the pre-Park era on overall aid effectiveness 
as oce in which foreign assistance was essential to the survival 
of the state but poorly used and unimaginatively planned and 
administered. Some preconditions for growth were created: ex- 
cess industrial capacity, an educated population, and foreign, 
modern specialized training in skills needed for development. 
The results, however, did not seem to equal the effort. 
It is now somewhat disingenuous to claim that because a 
later regime, under substantially different economic motivation 
and incentives, effectively used and built upon some of the 
assistance of the earlier period, this previous assistance was 
therefore "successful." In fact, the acsistance might have been 
better supplied to other sectors (or ccuntries) in greater or 
lesser amounts, and it should be remembered that it was the 
Koreans who made the later effective use of the capacity and 
(some) institutions created, not foreign technicians or policy 
specialists. "A [productive] base had been laid but the effec- 
tive exploitation of this base c,epended on a different political 
regime, a different set of economic policies, and a different 
relationship between gover~ment and business."58 
The charge that Korea began to grow essentially after 
foreign concessional assistance stopped is inaccurate and 
misleading. Concessional aid, provided by the Japanese (about 90 
percent of such assistance is from this source) continues, and 
the level of aid is, in the Korean case, less relevant than the 
changing economic policies and political will demonstrated by the 
Government. Such aid, however, was a necessary precondition for 
S7cole and Lyman. Chung (op, cit. 1 noted: "The economic aid cer- 
tainly appears to have provided the basis for much economic 
growth ... economic aid supplied the amount of resources equal to 
the level of net investment. This meant capital accumulation in 
South Korea during this period [1953-19651 was possible mainly 
because of the economic aid." The following quotation is from 
Krueger, p. 215. 
later growth, and there is no question that Korean economic suc- 
cess in some measure was dependent on earlier assistance. 
2.3 Export Promotion and Rapid Growth, 1961-1983 
The period of rapid growth of the Korean economy began 
during the regime of Park Chung Hee, apparently motivated by 
political factors as much as by economic considerations. The 
success of the program was, however, contrary to the expectations 
of most Koreans and foreigners at that time. 
2.3.1 Export Promotion and Political Will 
General Park Chung Hee and a group of officers from the 
Eighth Class of the Korean Military Academy seized power on May 
16, 1961 in a successful coup, the first such event since 1392, 
the founding of the Yi Dynasty. The coup leaders, despite their 
success, were at a distinct disadvantage. They had overthrown 
the popularly elected administration of Chang Myon (Syngman Rhee 
had been deposed a year earlier), one that came to power in one 
of the few fair elections Korea had seen, but during its brief 
tenure seemed disorganized and ineffective, perhaps a natural 
consequence following the years of political repression under 
Rhee. Park himself was suspect. 
Rhee, for all his failings, had a degree of political legi- 
timacy, at least at the beginning of his administration, for he 
had inviolable nationalist credentials as a result of his anti- 
Japanese struggle in exile. He also had the b ~ ~ k i n g  of the 
United States, at that time considered a political asset. Park, 
on the other hand, had no such legitimacy. He had been an 
officer in the Japanese army and had no nationalistic history. 
Coming from the army and from a poor rural (Kyungsang) lower 
class background, he had credibility neither with the intellec- 
tuals and gentry nor with the students or labor unions, whose 
activities the coup suppressed. Park was also at first suspected 
of being a leftist, as he had been arrested in connection with 
the communist-inspired Yosu-Sunch'on insurrection of 1948. 
The United States had been against the coup, both because it 
was committed to the democratically elected government of Chang 
Myon and because the leaders had moved troops without authoriza- 
tion from the UN command, controlled by the United States. 
Relations with the coup leaders remained very cool after the 
coup. The United States virtually forced Korea into holding the 
1963 elections, over Park's opposition, and used economic aid as 
one element in its pressure. 
The economic consequence of these political and social for- 
ces was that Park needed to acquire domestic legitimacy, which he 
could only obtain through the economic development of the coun- 
try. Bitterly disappointed in relations with the United States 
for the first 2 years after the coup, he resolved to increase 
Korean economic independence through a major policy shift that 
was a product of his political and economic needs; thus the ex- 
port drive was launched. If it succeeded, it would give him re- 
spectability at home and greater autonomy from the United States, 
on which, however, he had to continue to rely for military secur- 
ity, Park was also independent of the economic, industrial, and 
bureaucratic elements that had fostered the import substitution 
policy and may have intentionally attempted to reduce or elimi- 
nate their influence. The tension between security needs and 
economic forces dictated by Korean reliance on the United States 
has been a continuing theme from the Rhee period to the present, 
although contemporary disputes are about trade, not aid. 
There is considerable evidence for this conclusion, drawn 
both from Park's own statements on the need for greater autonomy 
and from economic actions taken without the close economic con- 
sultations that had previously been a pattern (even if with acri- 
monious overtones) of the Rhee period and were later important. 
Closely following the coup, a currency reform was initiated 
without U.S. consultation. The First Five-Year Plan (excavated 
from the Rhee period and revised) was promulgated without foreign 
advisor\,. assistance, in marked contrast with the Second Five-Year 
Plan (1967-19711, far which foreign advice was actively sought. 
Because the plan had its genesis in the Rhee period, it is not 
surprising that it was not oriented toward manufacturing exports. 
"The plan envisaged mainly import substitution and export of pri- 
mary products (not labor-intensive manufactures) to replace 
foreign aid. "59 The joint U.S. -Korean Economic Coordination 
Commission did not meet from 1961 to 1963. 
The first efforts by the Park Government following the coup 
were to consolidate power and authority throughout the state. 
Local government became appointive, not elective. The Economic 
Planning Board was formed to control and centralize both planning 
and budgeting. The commercial banks were all nationalized. The 
Ministry of Finance gained legal and de facto control over the 
central bank, monetary policy, and access to credit (an espe- 
cially potent source of power because debt as a percentage of 
Korean business liabilities was 82.5 percent, compared with 35 
percent in the United States) .60 The Office of Rural Develop- 
59~oungil Lim, Government Policy and Private Enterprise: Korean 
Experience in Industrialization (Berkeley: University of Cali- 
fornia, 1981) p. 16. 
ment was created, wedding agricultural research and extension, 
and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation was formed, 
combining an earlier cooperative movement with the Agricultural 
~ank. 61 The Government also consolidated labor unions, teacher 
associations, and cultural groups into umbrella confederations, 
allowing the state to control all potential sources of power and 
authority. Significantly, the state prohibited the formation of 
a national student federation, which the army considered would be 
a threat to the regime. Thus, while the state sought external 
autonomy from the United States, it took extensive steps to pre- 
vent any internal sources of autonomy or dissent. 
It was already apparent that Korea needed to mobilize inter- 
nal and external capital to accomplish its objectives. The 
knowledge that U.S. aid would diminish over time, as well as the 
experience with the United States after the coup and the politi- 
cal need to expand the economy rapidly and reduce the overwhelm- 
ing dependence on the United States, prompted a change in the 
donor reliance pattern,62 and indeed in the type of assistance 
from the major donor, the United States. Korea moved from grant 
supporting assistance to development loans, perhaps in part be- 
cause loans, even on the most concessional terms, seemed a sign 
of greater independence and self -reliance. 63 Although relations 
with the United States improved markedly after Park's to the 
United States in 1965, the Korean drive for economic autonomy and 
greater international political credibility led it to diversify 
its foreign donors and funding sources. 
2.3.2 Diversification of Donor Support 
In retrospect, the pattern of Korean movement from virtual 
exclusive reliance on the United States to a highly diversified 
and sophisticated array of mechanisms--including trade, aid, 
investment, and overseas industrial expansion--is obvious. It 
was not, however, a single event, but a process that still con- 
tinues. 
G1see Steinberg et al., Korean Agricultural Services, on the 
cooperatives, and Steinberg et al., Korean Agricultural Research: 
p- -- The Integration of Research and Extension, AID Project Impact 
Evaluation No. 17 (Washinqton, D.C.: AID, January 1982). on the 
Office of Rural ~evelo~ment. - 
- 
62~avid Cole, "Statement Before the House Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Organizations," typescript, 1978. 
63~ason et al., pp. 197-198. 
The first IBRD loan to Korea dates from 1962, as does the 
real start of Korea's efforts to encourage foreign investment by 
promulgation of a revised investment act. Karea encouraged the 
IBRD to form a consultative group to coordinate donor support; it 
first met in 1966. After the first oil crisis, Korea expanded 
its activities to the Middle East, with continuing and pronounced 
success. Korea has been sensitive to the need for persistent 
review of its trade and aid program, By far the most important 
new relationship that was established, wiCh implications for aid, 
trade, investment, and technology, was the reestablishment of 
relations with Japan. 
bespite the obvious economic sense of such a move, Rhee's 
adamant stand against reestablishing relations with the Japanese 
had considerable popular support. The United States strongly 
backed the move for normalization, as it was called. Park's 
high-handed method for normalization (involving highly question- 
able parliamentary tactics for its ratification in 1965) resulted 
in a series of student demonstrations. Park, however, persisted 
and imposed martial law. Normalization brought in some $800 
million (over a 10-year period), of which $300 million was to be 
in grants, $200 million in concessional loans, and an additional 
$300 million in commercial credits. In fact, from 1965 through 
1982, Japan had grown to become the third largest donor as well 
as the largest investor and trading partner of Korea. Japan has 
provided $4.413 billion in overall assistance, including $1.898 
billion in grants, loans, and technical assistance. After a 
Korean request for an additional $10 billion in support from 
Japan, agreement was reached in 1983 for $4.0 billion, of which 
$1.85 billion will come from the Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund (concessional assistance), and $2.15 billion from the 
Japanese Export-Import Bank together with other Japanese commer- 
cial banks, at interest rates to be determined. Interest rates 
will, however, be more than 4 percent.64 
It has been estimated that Japanese capital inflows contri- 
buted 10 percent of gross domestic capital formation in the first 
few years after normalization.65 Equally important, however, 
have been the technological innovations introduced into Korea 
from Japan. Through 1973, half of the technical assistance and 
G4~apanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs interview. The Korean Press 
(Korean Times, May 8, 1984) indicated that some of the funds will 
be used for the construction of five multipurpose dams. 
65~ak Chung Choo, Effects of the Vietnam War and the Normalization 
of the Korean-Japanese Relations in the Korean Economic Devei- 
opment in the 1960s (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1973). 
- 
Krueger (p. 114) argues that the success of the export drive was 
evident before normalization of relations with Japan. 
royalty payments paid by Korean firms were to Japan, but by 1982 
this figure had dropped to about one-third (total $668 million), 
with pir' ents to the United States slightly surpassing those to Japan. The network of foreign trade contacts provided by the 
large Japanese trading companies has handled a considerable per- 
centage of Korean trade, especially in Eastern Europe, The 
Japanese traders have even captured 82 percent of the sales of 
American grain to ~orea.67 
The sensitivity of the Japanese role in Korea to Koreans, 
many of whom still view Japan's interests on the peninsula with 
considerable concern, is quite understandable. It is neverthe- 
less evident that it is a Japanese model that was followed in 
industrial and agricultural pricing policy. Many of the admin- 
istrative forms and statutes in Korea derive from the Japanese, 
whom the Koreans often regard with both admiration and disdain. 
The Japanese have been the major investors in Korea. 
Through 1979, Japanese firms had invested some $587 million, or 
56 percent of all foreign investment in Korea since 1962,G8 when 
such investments began to be encouraged. Through 1983, approvals 
of Japanese investment totaled $843.4 in 663 projects, or 49.5 
percent of all investment.69 In contrast, the United States 
(excluding foreign subsidiaries of U.S, multinational firms), the 
second largest investor, had $409.7 million invested in Korea, or 
29.1 percent of the total. There is no distinction in the sta- 
tistics between Japanese investment and the investment of Koreans 
resident in Japan. For example, the single largest commercial 
investment has been by the Lotte company, which is owned by a 
Korean resident in Japan. 
If Japanese aid and investment have been pervasive, the 
lending of the World Bank has been of even greater magnitude. 
Since 1962, the Bank has provided $5.259 billion in assistance to 
Korea through April 6, 1984. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
has provided $1,377 billion since 1968, when its program began. 
Korea is the second largest borrower from the ADB. Both banks 
have made major investments in infrastructure, especially trans- 
portation, and both have provided substantial funds to Korean 
banks and institutions for relending to industry. 
666usiness Asia, Seoul, October 25, 1984, and Ministry of Science 
and Technology, 1983. 
67gusiness Korea, Seoul, May 1984. 
68~sian Development Bank, 1982. 
6 9 ~ . ~ .  Department of State, Airgram A-8, March 2, 1984 
(unclassified), "Foreign Equity Investment in Korea, 1983." 
In Korea, many believed that just as the Japanese had 
expanded their economy as a result of the Korean War, so the 
Koreans could progress during the Vietnam War. In fact, this was 
the case, In addition to the combat training for about half of 
the standing Korean army (in rotation), Korea was able to reap 
considerable economic rewards from that involvement. Through a 
series of construction and other service contracts, remittances, 
commercial exports to Vietnam, and military goods sales (as well 
as access to the American PX and commissary facilities, which 
were well used), earnings to the Korean economy from Vietnam were 
1 arge. 
Although there are ssae discrepancies in the published 
figures, earnings from Vietnam were 10.6 percent of foreign 
exchange earnings in 1966, 19.4 percent in 1967, and 17.' percent 
in 1968.~0 They have also been calculated at 1.5 percenr of GNP 
in 1965, 2.2 percent in 1966, 3.7 percent from 1967 to 1969, and 
4.4 percent in 1970.71 Overall, its Vietnam involvement may 
have contrikred $660 million to the Korean economy between 1968 
and 1971. Other figures place the total between 1965 and 1973 at 
$926.3 million.72 Korea's share of exports to Vietnaa as a per- 
centage of Korea's total exports was considerably lower than that 
of Japan's to Korea during the Korean War. Korea also reaped 
psychic rewards from Vietnam; for the first time Korea was a pro- 
vider of assistance, not just a recipient. 
The overall effect of both the Japanese normalization and 
the involvement in Vietnam, which occurred at about the same 
time, is estimated to have contributed one-third to one-half of 
Korea's GNP growth, adjusted for inflation.73 At the time, with 
a significant drop in U.S. economic assistance during this 
period, these events were especially important to the growth of 
the Korean economy. 
70cole and Lyman. 
71~ho0, Effects of the Vietnam War. 
72"~2oul 's Second Bonanza, " Far Eastern Economic Review, July 30, 
1973. Counting foreign exchange earned from U.S. forces in 
Korea, both sources amounted to almost one-third of all Korean 
foreign exchange earnings between 1966 and 1969. 
73~ho0, Effects of the Vietnam War. 
2.4 From Aid to Trade and Investment 
The ramifications of Korea's change from a major foreign aid 
recipient to an important trading and industrializing nation, 
with considerable attractioUs for foreign investors and, even 
more important, for foreign lenders, extend beyond the foreign 
exchange earned. A variety of other purposes were and continue 
to be served, These give added impetus to the continuing need 
for trade expansion. They include the diplomatic (more than 
economic) competition with North Korea in the Third World, the 
economic reinforcement of the mutual security treaty with the 
United States, the ties with Japan, access to Middle Eastern oil, 
and the acquisition of technology necessary to remain competitive 
in a world economy. How has foreign assistance affected this 
process, if at all? 
Export expansion also has important internal implications 
affecting employment, wages, imports, the nature of the con- 
centration of private economic power in Korea, and the role of 
the Government in managing an increasingly complex economy. It 
has thus both growth and equity consequences. 
The Korean economy in 1983 was generally healthy. GNP in 
real terms grew at 9.3 percent, reaching $75 billion. Per capita 
GNP rose to $1,880, and is prclicted to be $1,974 in 1984. 
Foreign debt reached $40.1 billion in 1983 (the fourth highest 
debt in the developing world after Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), 
but the debt service ratio remained manageable at 15.4 percent, 
or at 20 percent including short-term debt. Exports reached 
$24.4 billior,, while imports were $26.2 billion. At the close of 
the present fifth Five-Year Plan in 1986, the Korean economy is 
expected to grow to $97 billion, and per capita income to attain 
$2,325.74 The prospects in general for Korea are positive, 
although there are indications of stress in some sector3 of the 
economy. 
The competitiveness of Korea's export trade is a product of 
a continuing realistic exchange rate, competitive prices, edu- 
cated domestic labor and its increased productivity with rela- 
tively low, controlled (but rising) wages, more sophisticated 
technology, export incentives, and political determination to 
succeed, 
Although it may be argued that the remarkable rural progress 
that has transpired throughout Korea was in some major measure 
attributable to a network of subsidies that are now beginning to 
74r~conomic Trends Report, ' U.S. Embassy, Seoul, April 1984. 
unwind.75 this cannot be said of export growth, at least to the 
same degree, Although there was in 1968 an 8-cent subsidy on 
every dollar exported, covering an average loss of 16 perc->nt of 
the export price,76 a later more detailed study stated: 
Other empirical analysis indi~ated that the remarkable 
export growth, 33 percent in real terms per annum for 
1965-79, was zchieved not by overgenerous export sub- 
sidies but by an incentive system which approaches on 
average the effective protection and effective subsidy 
rate that can be expected from a free trade regime. 
Also, the long-run trend of real effective exchange 
rate which more or less remained roughly constant 
despite short-term fluctuations indicates that the 
export incentives in terms of the effective exchange 
rate remained constant.77 
Continued export expansion has been dependent on, and is 
likely to remain tied to, both the concentration of economic 
power in Korea (and thus the issue of equity in access to the 
market place) and higher technology, 
The Korean economic scene is dominated by the emergence of 
the chaebol (Jea-Bul--or zaibats~ in Japanese, conglomerates in 
English), multipurpose and multiproduct firms that largely 
control the Korean economy.78 These conglomerates are both 
7 5 ~ e e  Steinberg et al., Korean Agricultural Services, for a 
discussion of the implications of this. 
76~rank Baldwin, ed., Without Parallel: The American-Korean 
Relatronship Since 1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 19731, 
p, 242. 
7 7 ~ d h ,  Suk Tai, The Effects of Export Incentives on Korea Export 
Growths 1953-79, Working Paper No. 8107 (Seoul: Korea 
Development Institute), p. IV-3. 
78~his and the following is drawn from Leroy Jones, 2nd Jae-Bui, 
Leroy Jones and I1 Sakong, Gotzrnment, Business and Entrepre- 
neurship in Economic Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Warvard University Press, 1980). T h e ~ a s t e r n  
Economic Review (July 19,:Q84) has characterized the chaebol as 
- 
follows: "Although the story of their growth is part and parcel 
of South Korea's economic miracle, the way they have concentrated 
so much---largely throdgh cheap preferential loans, government 
protection and low wages--has generated tremendous resentment." 
The publication, in separate articles, describes the Government's 
efforts to concentrate emphasis m relatively few firms in such 
fields as pharmaceuticals and advertising. 
similar to and different from similar organizations in other 
nations. They are uniquely Korean in that they are generally 
characterized by single-family ownership, usually led by one 
individual, which is quite different from thase in other coun- 
tries. They are similar, however, in that they are diversified 
in products, but different in that they have not controlled 
financial institutions, which are either directly operated or 
regulated by government. (They have recently, however, bought 
into five commercial banks that have been denationalized-- 
Sansung, for example, has 14 percent of Commercial Bank and 26 
percent of First City Bank shares.) Thus, the Government has a 
much greater degree of control than in other nations and has used 
the conglomerates to pursue new economic directions, such as the 
development of the defense industry, often at considerable eco- 
nomic risk. 
The conglomerates have been growing even more rapidly than 
the economy as a whole. The largest 46 firms in 1973 produced 
9.8 percent of the gross domestic product, but 17.1 percent by 
1978, or 23 percent of nonagricultural GDP (in fact, the top 5 
firms 2roduced about half of that amount). Of the Fortune 500 
firms, 10 are Korean, and Korea has four out of the top five of 
private, d2veloping country entities. 
Becacse the individual subsidiaries of the conglomerates can 
qualify for loans from the Small and Medium Industry Bank, this 
increasing concentration of economic power, under stringent 
goverament control of credit, has meant less access to the formal 
credit market for smaller firms, indeed an emphasis on larger 
firms in many fields. The IBRD and the Asian Development Bank 
projects have thus expanded this economic concentration and may 
further exacerbate inequitable access to credit. This concentra- 
tion is effective, however, in stimulating the economies of 
scale. If there are problems with credit equity (for there is no 
"neutral" institutional source of credit in Korea, although there 
is planned liberalization), it is also evident that the larger 
firms' salaries are considerably better than those of the smaller 
firms, probably providing increased equity in that regard. 
Because employment in small industrial firms dropped from 64.7 
percent in 1960 to 24.7 percent in 1976, the growth of the 
conglomerates has generally and substantially contributed to 
higher wages. With emphasis on higher technology, however, the 
gap between large firms (which can use such technology more easi- 
ly) and smaller firms may increase. In addition, there may be 
growing disparities among incomes within the larger firms. 
The technology issue is intimately associated with trade 
expansion, because Korean labor is already working long hours 
(about 55 per week, up from 45 hours a decade earlier), and 
improved productivity (thus international competitiveness and 
high wages) is integrally associated with technology. The growth 
of technological competence has been of concern to each of the 
donors, including the training of key staff and the strengthening 
and creation of such institutions as the Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology. This donor concern with training and 
with scientific institutions no doubt contributed to Korea's 
technological capacity at all levels, and as far as can be ascer- 
tained, the funds generally were and are still being well used. 
Although Korea by 1978 invested 0.7 percent of GNP in 
research and development (more than Argentina, Brazil, and India, 
for example) and had comparatively more scientists and engineers 
than those other countries (22,000 per million of population) ,79 
Korea has used trade to develop its technology more than any 
other means. Three-quarters of foreign buyers designate specifi- 
cations for'go~ds, for the general experience is that Korea has 
had a strong record in the development of process technology but 
is weak on product design. Technology has been formally acquired 
(i,e., purchased or transferred) about one-third of the time, but 
informal means, such as employees' previous experience and 
buyers' information, have proven more valuable. 
To continue growth and further raise living standards will 
require increasing levels of technology and its wide dispersion. 
Donors have recognized this need and have provided various levels 
of training to facilitate economic mobility and to ensure that 
there are institutional and financial means by which technology 
can be introduced into Korea. The response of donors to this 
need has been appropriate, but given the magnitude, and the human 
infrastructure already developed, it must be admitted that the 
donor contribution has been useful but marginal in the aggregate. 
Foreign investment in Korea is still less important than the 
size of the Korean economy might indicate. Through the end of 
1983, there have been cumulative investments of $1.4 billion 
since 1962. Of this amount, the largest shares are in chemicals 
(19.3 percent), electric and electronic products (14.7 percent) 
hotels and tourism (11.5 percent), and textiles (9.7 percent). 8 b  
Japan is the leading investor, with over half of the value (50.5 
percent), followed by the United States (29.1 percent, excluding 
foreign subsidiaries of U,S. multinational firms). Investment 
has been small relative to the size and potential of the economy 
because of the fear of conflict on the peninsula, the uncertainty 
about the future political leadership and the political process, 
and past tight Government controls on investment that, however, 
have recently been relaxed. 
The expansion of trade, exports, and investment has meant an 
increase in employment, important drops in unemployment and 
7 9 ~ a r r ~  Westphal, Work Bank study (unpublished). 
8 0 ~ . ~ .  Embassy, Seoul, "Foreign Equity Investment in Korea, 1983." 
under-employment, and large-scale rural-to-urban migration fcr  
the jobs created, This has greatly increased per capita income 
and, to the extent that Zonors have facilitated the precess, it 
has been an important contribution, even though the magnitude of 
cornmercial flows has dwarfed concessional assistance. 
Is there, then, a conflict between trade and aid, or can 
trade substitute for aid, as some suggest? The Korean evidence 
is not conclusive, but it suggests that (1) aid was an important 
precondition to developin9 strong trading capacity and links and 
( 2 )  training and exposure to external economic conditions, 
together with the enhancing of broad skills (not necessarily only 
those that are technological, although they are critical), are 
important elements of foreign assistance. 
Even in broadly successEul trade regimes such as Korea, it 
may be useful to continue a variety of innovative and longer term 
investments in fields with concessional assistance, such as 
research. It is also clear that donor confidence in Korea, as 
evidenced by concessional lending, has been an important factor 
in Korea's securing commercial credits. The supposed dichotomy 
between trade and aid is not an accurate portrayal of the Korean 
scene, and on the basis of the Korean experience should be care- 
fully scrutinized in other countries. 
2.5 -- The Contribution - of Donors to Korean Growth 
-- - --- --- 
It is apparent that some potential for qrowth was created 
during the pre-Park period, especially in excess industrial. capa- 
city and the training of individual; in technical fields. Thus 
the support of the United States, as the critical donor, was 
important. The basic donor contribution, however, was in the 
maintenance of some semblance of a government in South Korea and 
the relief and rehabilitation operation that led to raising the 
standard of living to prewar levels. One study concluded: 
The massive inflow of foreign assistance before and 
during the Korean War was essential to the survival of 
South Korea as an independent country. Continuation of 
a high level of economic assistance for the decade 
after the war probably made the difference between the 
small 1.5 percent per annum growth rate and no growth 
at all in per capita income. Without this growth, the 
living standard of the population would have remained 
desperate, political cohesion would have deteriorated, 
and the foundations for subsequent high growth would 
not have been forged. Thus, aid played a critical role 
for the two decades from the mid-1940s to the mid- 
1960s. Since then it has added perhaps one percent to 
the already high growth rate and therefore can be 
characterized as relatively inconsequential .el 
Growth did occur after 1953, and at levels that would please 
many developing societies today, but the rate of growth was not 
commensurate with the resources provided from cutside, nor the 
relatively advanced institutional base on which Korea began its 
growth, even allowing for the massive destruction of the Korean 
War. 
In the 1960s, under Park, foreign assistance was also essen- 
tial, not for maintenance of the regime but for the expansion of 
the economy. The use of funds was generally prudent and the 
diversification of donor support was wise, as reliance by any 
nation on any single democratic donor puts the recipient at the 
mercy of the whims of the donor's electorate. Equally important 
was the effort by the Korean Government to generate internal 
investment and revenues. These were accomplished by the upward 
adjustments made in interest rates on longer term savings, the 
advice of foreign technical assistants in 1965, and the rigorous 
enforcement of tax and other regulations on both industry and 
individual incomes. 
In the 1970s, foreign assistance probably was not absolutely 
necessary, as foreign exchange earnings were beginning to be 
impressive in aggregate terms, and Korea was able to attract com- 
mercial capital and credit outside of foreign assistance. 
Koreans had already been trained, highly qualified Korean schol- 
ars and technicians had been attracted to return to Korea from 
their residences abroad, and the bureaucratic mechanisms were i~ 
place, together with the political will to use them for the eco- 
nomic and other purposes of the state. 
Foreign assistance during this period was effectively and 
efficiently used, but its contribution was of a different order 
of magnitude from that in the previous periods. Foreign aid pro- 
bably speeded the adoption of various reforms and the development 
of certain industries and institutions. More important, it pro- 
bably also encouraged the Korean Government to make certain 
investments (such as in various types of technical education) 
more comprehensively and quickly than they otherwise might have 
done, and it further strengthened the role of those in the Korean 
Government anxious to liberalize the economy. 
The external and internal encouragement of Kor@a to continue 
to borrow has created a wmassivew debt burden for the nation. 
81~avid C. Cole, "Foreign Assistance and Development," p. 26; see 
also David Cole, Youngil Lim, and Paul Kuznets, --- The Korean 
Economy--Issues of Development (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1980). 
Korea in 1983 had a debt of some $40.1 billion, and a debt ser- 
vice ratio over 20 percent, including short-term debt, Korea has 
the largest debt of any nation in Asia, and although the magni- 
tude of Korea's obligations are dwarfed by a number of Latin 
American nations, there are many in Korea who are concerned. 
This concern is not shared by many professional observers outside 
of Korea, because interest on the debt is less than the value of 
3 months of exports. 
Korea has shown remarkable resiliency in meeting the recent 
global economic shocks. In some sense, however, Korea's ability 
to meet its international economic obligations will depend not 
only on the state of the world economy but on the internal poli- 
tical scene and the capacity of the state to adapt to an orderly 
transfer of power. 
3. GROWTH WITH EQUITY? THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE 
That Korea has become one of the fastest growing nations in 
the world is beyond question. Whether that growth has been 
accompanied by improved or worsened income distribution, how 
income distribution has shifted over time, and the likely future 
direction of such changes are more complex issues. They are also 
ones on which data are more limited and often in dispute. The 
fragility of that evidence is readily apparent and has been noted 
in the literature, some of which will be cited below. 
The issue of equity, beginning with its definition, excites 
considerable interest and often controversy. Obliquely incor- 
porated into the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, equity has 
relevance for the United States and for other countries. 
The equity question in developing societies is more stark 
than in the West, as resources there are more limited. When 
growth occurs, a relatively small, concentrated group normally 
prospers; and this prosperity may seem more grating as income 
disparities are very pronounced because the deprived start from a 
lower base. Although such problems were often politically 
tolerated in the West for long periods, a more concentrated popu- 
lation and mass communications, sometimes even in largely illi- 
-.rate societies, have resulted in a lowered political boiling 
p It. 
This problem, with its political ramifications, inevitably 
raises the issue of the strength of various types of governments 
in producing a growth environment. Especially salient is the 
issue of authoritarian regimes. Can such governments deal with 
growth more effectively, and is a denial of equity essential for 
growth? Some studies have evaded the question.82 The issue 
could be the subject of a separate essay. 
The Korea case is, however, particularly difficult and the 
issue cannot be avoided, even if it cannot be resolved. Economic 
growth has clearly outpaced political development, and par- 
ticipation has languished even as exports have increased, Having 
fought a war to preserve the independence of Korea, and having 
done so in the name of fostering democratic government, the 
United Nations, and especially the United States, has a con- 
tinuing commitment to the Republic of Korea. Faced with the per- 
ceived continuing threat from North Korea, the South Korean 
Governnmt has called upon its citizenry for political and eco- 
nomic sacrifices. 
No resolution is likely of the issue of how much equity is 
required or desirable with economic growth, as the problem is one 
of degree, as are the issues of what groups should sacrifice to 
what extent for the common good, and the nature of such sacrifi- 
ces in the face of a perceived North Korean threat. No group 
will be satisfied by any arbitrary formula, which would likely be 
an unrealistic possibility in any given society, and although 
this author desires the greatest possible degree of equity, he 
recognizes this difficulty. The normative issue cannot be 
resolved, even in the case of Korea, in this essay. 
Equity in income is difficult to achieve in a period of 
rapid growth. As one author concladed, "our experience with a 
range of policies indicates that it is much easier to make the 
income distribution worse than to improve it.'83 Yet Korea has 
a generally good overall reputation in equity terms, at least as 
compared with most economies in Asia. As the Harvard-Korean 
Development Institute studies indicated: 
One of the most striking features of Korean economic 
development since 1945 is that development has been 
achieved without requiring or causing a highly unequal 
distribution of income. In World Bank publications and 
other international forums, Korea has been hailed as a 
prime example of how growth can be achieved with 
equity. According to the data presented in these 
forums, Korea is among only a handful of less-developed 
8 2 ~ h e  Harvard-Korea Development Institute studies do not answer 
this question. See Mason et al. 
8 3 ~ r m a  Adelman and Sherman Robinson, InconttpD 
--  
University Press, 19781, p. 
nations that have achieved a level of equality com- 
parable to that of the advanced world economies. 8 4  
Korea "is generally regarded as being exceptionally success- 
ful in combining rapid growth with advance in equity .... First, 
the distribution of income in Korea is among the best in the 
developing world."85 Four issues that flow from that statement 
and that must be addressed are (1) is this in fact true; ( 2 )  if 
so, why; (3) what lessons can be drawn from Korea that might be 
applicable to other countries; and ( 4 )  can donors apply these 
lessons elsewhere? 
3.1 Economic Issues in Equity: Overall Considerations 
Two factors have been critical in determining the positive 
degree of economic equity in Korea in addition to those attri- 
butes discussed at the beginning of this essay. These are the 
destruction of assets during the Korean War and the role of the 
military in creating social and economic mobility. 
There have been, of course, factors that have restricted 
equity in Korea. Predominant among them is the class structure 
of Korean society, which has been more highly stratified and 
hierarchical than that of its neighbor, China. Although the 
Japanese removed the Korean monarch and the royal family, the 
yangban (gentry) retained their social standing (subordinate, of 
course, to the Japanese), if not much of their income, at least 
if it was rurally based. Rapid economic growth is breaking down 
some of these old distinctions. The actions of the military to 
democratize and expand higher education could be interpreted as 
much as an attempt to wipe out the remnants of a class structure 
that was already being threatened by the growth of the economy as 
it is a desire to provide more and better trained individuals for 
an industrial base in which higher technology is increasingly 
important. Residual class structure is reflected in the prestige 
of government positions (formally the abode of the literati) and 
the hierarchy of the bureaucratic culture that continues to be a 
critical factor in the excellent implementation record of deve- 
lopment projects by Korean institutions. 
84~ason et al., p. 408. Mason goes on to explain that disaggrega- 
tion of the data into farm, urban, and business incomes is essen- 
tial, as are regional differences. 
8 5 ~ .  C. Rao, Economic Growth and Equity in the Republic of Korea, 
world Bank Reprint Series Number 52 (Washington, D.C.: World 
- 
Bank, 1978). This study concentrates on the economic aspect of 
equity . 
A s  land reform equalized poverty in the rural sector, so the 
Korean War, in its destruction of industrial and urban assets, 
did much the same for the remainder of the country. Thus, with 
the armistice, the bulk of the populace, including the large 
refugee populatioti that had fled from the north, faced the dire 
prospects of an uncertain economic future in a state of equalized 
misery, differentiated. largely by remnants of a strong class 
system and the memory of its former perquisites. 
The last element promoting equity in Korean society is the 
military, If a massive change in social structure has begun in 
Korea, with greater mobility and access in the society through 
some institutional change, it started first with the military and 
then has been reflected in part in the business community. 
Based on a universal male draft system, the military offered 
the poor but promisiag man an opportunity for education based on 
ability (as did the Japanese military in the colonial era). 
Military experience at all levels has been an important, but 
unquantified, element in Korean economic growth, and its training 
provided the basic skills for a continuously mechanizing civilian 
society. Military leaders were placed intentionally in key civi- 
lian jobs to provide mobility for younger officers and to place 
trusted subordinates in influential positions, both bureaucratic 
and business. They have provided an interesting mix of effec- 
tiveness through combining internationally recognized competence 
in management with an ability to use more traditional associa- 
tions, based on military academy graduating class affiliations, 
to accomplish their professional goals. 
The effect of foreign training on thousands of Korean offi- 
cers may never be known (nor is it possible here to determine the 
relationship in the Korean case between the military and economic 
growth). It is ironic, however, that the military command struc- 
ture, while reinforcing the hierarchical nature of the Government 
to give it one of the strongest forces for effective implemen- 
tation of foreign aid that donors have yet witnessed, opened 
significant avenues of social mobility for many males. 
3.2 National Income and Income Distribution 
Starting from a very low base, per capita annual income in 
Korea has risen rapidly since 1960. From about $60 that year, it 
reached over $1,883 in 1983 while per capita GNP rose from $180 
in 1960 to $1,480 in 1981. 86 It is estimated that in the early 
1960s, 40 percent of the population was below the poverty line, 
86~orld Bank, World Development Report, 1982. 
but by 1980 this had fallen to about 10 percent87 (see Table 2 ) .  
The World Bank however, estimated that by 1979, 18 percect of the 
urban population and 11 percent of the rural population were 
still below the absolute poverty levels of $370-and $310 respec- 
tively. 88 
Table 2. Percentage of the Korean ~ o ~ u l a t i o n ~ ~  Below 
the Poverty Level, 1965, 1970, and 1976 
Year Urban Rural Total 
There seems no disagreement that poverty and its indices 
declined significantly between 1965 and 1976, with the first half 
of that period showing a more rapid rate of decrease than the 
second half. This difference was due to a more rapid rate of 
development in the first period.90 A drop in the rate of 
poverty based on a high growth strategy with employment expansion 
means that the percentage of the "hard corew poor will be higher, 
as those with some economic mobility will rise above povertv, and 
that there will likely be increasing income disparities between 
elements of the population even if the majority are better off. 
This is also true for high growth in rural areas based on more 
effective agricultural inputs. There has been a shift of the 
poor from the rural to urban areas, as there has been a shift in 
the overall population. This is also probably because the 
majority of the functionally landless moved to urban areas, and 
remittances from the cities provide a large portion of the income 
of those left behind. 
87~sian Development Bank, 1982. 
88world Bank, 1982. 
89~hese figures are from Sang Mok Suh, The Patterns of Poverty 
in Korea, Working Paper No. 79n3 (Seoul: Korea Development 
Institute, April 19791, p. 30. 
gO~hese and other statistics are from Sang Mok Suh, p. 62. 
If there is general agreement about the Kor~an accomplish- 
ments aggregated at the national level, or at least in the magni- 
tude of the change as reflected in these figures, there is far 
less agreement about how this income is distributed. Some 
earlier laudatory comments have already been cited. The Asian 
Development Bank, while agreeing, in a later report adds a note 
of caution: "Despite the fact that income distribution has wor- 
sened in recent years Korea has managed to combine rapid growth 
with a fair measure of justice. "91 
This disagreement is complicated by past haphazard data 
collection, the time dimensions to which various comments refer, 
and the types of data that were excluded at varying periods. 
Kuznets wrote, "There is no regularly published information on 
how income is distributed among Korea's various income 
groups,"92 and Choo noted the inadequate data on income distri- 
bution.93 Mason commented that the data "are flawed in the 
extreme. "94 
The selective aspects of data collection and inclusion have 
caused many observers to treat the material with caution. 
choog5 noted the exclusion of eup (market town) residents from 
urban figures, those with incomes over W2 million from all calcu- 
lations, and very small farmers from rural calculaticns. "These 
deficiencies in city and rural household surveys tend to result 
in a bias toward an over-representation of those nearer the mean 
of the size distribution of income by eliminating the represen- 
tation of households in the two extreme income classes." 
~ao96 has also commented on the limitations of the data and 
suggested, "The urban survey is confined to wage and salary earn- 
ers rather than to all income earners and excludes those who earn 
more than a specified ceiling; the rural survey appears to define 
income as inclusive of changes in the book value of inventories 
and thus to overstate rural incomes in periods of rising inven- 
gl~sian Development Bank, 1982. 
92~aul W. Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of 
Korea, p. 62. 
9 J ~ a k  Chung Choo, Review of Income Distribution Studies, Data 
Availability and Associated Problems for Korea, The Philippines 
and Taiwan (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, September 1974). 
g4~ason et al., p. 408. 
95~ak Chung Choo, Review. 
96~a0, op. cit. 
tories and grain prices." Mason also has commented on the inade- 
quacy of the information and the problem of exclusion, counseling 
caution in its use, and considered that national data are not 
useful, but must be broken down into urban, rural, and business 
categories -97 
Reviewing the data for 1966, 0shima98 in an earlier study 
noted that the data eliminated single-person households and rural 
households without arable land (generally the poorsr grccps); his 
analysis produced the distribution presented in Table 3 ,  
Table 3. Income Distribution by Deciie Groups 
for Korea and the Philippines, 1966 
(percentages) 
Korea 4.0 5.0 7.0 7.0 9.0 9.0 11.0 12.0 15.0 21.0 
Philip- 
pines 1.1 2.9 3.0 4.7 5.8 6.9 9.0 11.6 15.0 40.0 
In comparison with the United States, Japan, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka, these figures 
suc-gest that Korea has the most income distributed among the bot- 
tom half of the population and the least income in the top 50 
percent. Oshima estimates the Gini coefficient for Korea at 
abaut 0.25 at that time, compared to the Philippines with 0.51. 
Official figures99 for selected years between 1965 and 1980 are 
presented in Table 4. 
97~ason et al, Chapter 12. 
g8~arry Oshima, "Income Inequality and Economic Growt:, : The 
Postwar Experience of As;=rl Co~ntries,~ Malaya Economic Rek'.?w_ 
15, 2 (October 1970). 
99~sian Development Bank ( 1982 quoting the Economic Planning 
Board. Wade and Kim (pp. 79-81) indicate that in 1970, the 
lowest 40 percent received 1 8  percent of income; the middle 40 
percent, 3 7  percent of income; and the \,, 20 percent, 45 percent 
of income. World Bank (1982) figures indicate that for the late 
1970s (between 1976 and 19791, the highest 5 percent received 
16.1 percent of income; the top 20 percent, 4 5 . 3  percent of in- 
come; the lowest 20 percent, 5.7 percent. What is more important 
than the discrepancies in these figures, which are relatively 
minor and probably all derive from the same or similar surveys, 
is that the income disparities are worsening. 
Table 4. Korean Economic Planning Board Figures on Income 
Distribution, Selected Years, 1965-1980 
Income Bracket 1965 19 70 1975 1980 
Top 20% 41.8 41.6 45.3 46.7 
Lower 40% 19.3 19.6 16.8 15.4 
There seems to be no question that there has been a con- 
tinuous rise in incomes in the period since 1961. (One year 
stands out as an anomoly because of the failure of the rice crop 
in 1980. The oil shocks played a role, but not to the same 
degree, as Korea deftly weathered those difficult periods.) 
Although all the evidence is supportive of a rise in incomes in 
real (as opposed to nominal) tsrms, there is also evidence that 
there are increasing disparities between incomes (see Table 51, 
both between the urban and rural sector and between the richer 10 
percent of the population and those at the bottom. 
Although there are those who argue that Korea has maintained 
reasonable income distribution because of policies supportive of 
kquity, the contrary seems likely. Before the policy changes of 
1971 that positively affected the rural sector--those of the 
Third Five-Year Plan--and those of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, 
which were designed to improve some of the social deficiencies in 
the society, it can be argued that Korean Government policies, at 
best, took little account of the poorest elements of the popula- 
tion. "Government labor and agricultural policies have discrimi- 
nated against peasants and industrial workers, two major occu a- 
tional groups at the bottom of the income-size distribution. "Po0 
There was little internal pressure after 1961 for government 
to consider the immediate needs-of either the urban workers or 
the farmers, for there was little participation by either group 
in decision-making. Labor unions were closely controlled and 
strikes were not sanctioned (except against the U.S military wit 
Government connivance), and local government was appointed, not 
elected. There seems general agreement with the conclusion that 
"Government policies toward labor in Korea prevented real wages 
from rising except in response to labor shortages in the late 
100~uznets, Economic Growth, p. 106-7. 
Table 5, Within Sectora Income Inequality, Selected Years, 
1963-1975 
(in Gini coefficients 
Rural Income Urban Income Business Income Overall 
Year Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequal i tyb 
a ~ r o m  Mason et al., p, 411 
b ~ r o m  Sang Mok Suh, p. 40 
1960s."~O~ A study of labor management negotiations from 1977 
to 1981 indicated that by 1981 union representation was essen- 
tially meaningless in bargaining terms. Final settlements 
averaged only 1.6 percent over managements8 initial offer.102 
Since that study was made, labor legislation has become even more 
stringent, 3nd labor unions have lost many members, as unions 
have become illegal in smaller work units. The Korean Federation 
of Trade Unions estimates that in May 1983, monthly salaries for 
all workers averaged about half of the $685 monthly income 
required to maintain minimally a family of five, and the gap is 
widening, 
Whether Korea was jk.~+ified in equity terms in keeping urban 
manufacturing wages low at the begiming of the export drive (and 
attempting to keep increases as low as possible today) is a 
separate issue, but it has allowed Korea to compete effectively 
on the international market. There is, of cot -se, the argument 
that the most important aspect of improving income distribution 
is to provide employment, and this the Government did. Official 
figures on unemployment are often suspect, but the large migra- 
lokharles Frank, Kuang Suk Kim, and Larry Westphal, Foreign Trade 
Regimes and Economic Development: South Korea (New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 19751, p. 242. 
102~ooken, Kim, Employment Wages and Manpower Policies in Korea: 
The - Issues. worEing Paper No. 82-04, (Seoul: Korean Development 
Institute August 1982), p. 73. See also, "Labor Problems. Long- 
Term Peace ~ k o s ~ e c t s  ~ o o k  Poor ," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
July 19, 1984, 
tion of the rural population into the cities (Korea is now essen- 
tially an urban society and the farm population is rapidly aging) 
and the growing proportion of urban remittanc2s as a percentage 
of rural income would seem to validate the estimates of the drop 
in unemployment rates from 8.2 percent to 4.1 percent and 
underemployment from 24.4 to 11.4 percent. Government also, 
however, could be accused of sanctioning underpayment of women 
who, for the first time, entered the industrial labor market in 
large numbers. They were paid wages in semi-skilled, light 
industry (such as in textiles, battery manufacturing, and so 
forth) that were clearly a form of supplemental family income, 
not a living wage, and were substantially lower than those of the 
male population. Korea in the past has refused to have a minimum 
wage and did not join the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
for that reason. Such a wage, however, is likely in the next few 
years, and Kore; plans to join the ILO in 1985. 
Increasing employment has been critical to equity: 
Korea was driven by the forces of comparative advantage 
to expand labor-intensive manufacturing activities. 
This has generated a rapid growth of employment, which 
directly benefited those at the lower end of the income 
scale. The marked improvement in the employment status 
of the population is undoubtedly the most important 
continuing influence in favor of equity in ~ 0 r e a . l ~ ~  
Real urban-worker income did rise significantly, as shown in 
Table 6. It doubled bet wee^ 1965 and 1970, and almost doubled 
again by 1980. 
It is virtually impossible, however, to determine the degree 
of donor community contribution to growth of employment, and the 
proportion of that growth to which we can assign commercial 
flows, private foreign investment, and the growth cf a strong 
overseas labor market and construction industry (that. by 1981 
employed 168,000 ~oreansl04 and was valued at over $13 
billion 1 .  
Donor assistance, however, was calculated to be important in 
this process. The Asian Development Bank, for exarcpie, estimated 
104~orld Bank, 1982. The Bank of Korea shows no individual remit- 
tances or construction contract reflows to Korea before 1970. 
(The Vietnam War effort is separately calculated.) Construction 
and services abroad grew from $1.8 million in 1970 to $2.4 
billion in 1982 ($1.9 billion in 1983). Individual remittances 
were $33.1 million in 1970 and $120.6 million in 1983. 
that loans to the Korea Long Term Credit 3ank alone generated 
some 56,137 jobs between 1968 and 1983 at an average cost of 
$39,700, but that costs per job had risen from $28,000 for the 
first loan to $86,000 for the third.lo5 This increase was 
partly due to inflation, and partly to the expansion of the capi- 
tal intensity of investment; the capital output ratio went from 
2.4 to 6.3 as Korea moved into heavy, capital-intensive 
industry. 
Table 6. Growth of  orean an Urban Worker Household Income, 
Selected Years, 1965-1979 
(constant 1970 won) 
Daily Wage- 
All Salary & Wage- Annual Earner Annual 
Year Earlier Housnholds Increase Households Increase 
Soilrce: Republic of Korea Statistical Yearbook, various years, 
adapted from a dissertation by John Slaboda. 
The prospects for improving equity over the next decade by 
continuously expanding employment look dim. To keep competitive 
in the world market, Korea is wisely planning to move into export 
industries with a higher level of technology, leaving the tradi- 
tional light industries, where labor productivity and wages are 
lower, to other countries or (as in Bangladesh) investing in tex- 
tile manufacturing there. This will mean greater capital inten- 
sity of employment and generally a slower expansion of employ- 
ment. This will come durinq a period when, because of normal lag 
time, the labor force will be expanding faster than the popula- 
tion growth, even though the latter has dropped from 2.8 in 1960 
to 1.6 in 1979. This is likely to continue until the end of this 
105~sian Development Bank, 5th Loan to --- the Korea Long Term - Credit 
Bank, KOR-Ap-64, October 1983. 
century.106 AS traditional attitudes erode, more women are 
likely to enter the labor force; their participation has already 
increased from 25.8 percent in 1960 to 32.6 in 1979.107 If, as 
seems likely because of widening income disparities between rural 
and urban sectors, rural migration continues, slower growth in 
employment in more capital-intensive industries will have impor- 
tant implications for continued equity. 
Rao has calculated the equity implications under different 
growth levels. He concluded that unless there is substantial and 
sustained growth, the Gini coefficient of 0.383 for 1976 might 
rise to 0.456 by 1990: "the rate of growth of Korea's GNP would 
have to be sustained at over 9 p.a, [per annuml in order to pre- 
vent an increase in the number of those below the minimum income 
level and a steady deterioration in relative inequalities of 
incorne."l08 Although 1983 reached that level (9.3 percent), it 
is not planned for the balance of the Fifth Five-Year Plan and is 
probably not consistently attainable. 
Another economic aspect of equity to be considered here is 
access to the marketplace. To what degree has the Government 
fostered equal access to the market? In the expanding Korean 
economy, access to internal and external markets is largely a 
product of access to credit. 
The credit mechanisms in Korea are twofold: (1) the curb or 
informal market that until recently was unstructured, volatile, 
and poorly documented with high interest rates prevailing; and 
( 2 )  the institutional markets that have been virtually controlled 
by the Government. The Government has been able to control the 
allocation of credit, both foreign and domestically generated, 
through its domination of the banks in urban areas and the 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation in the rural sector. 
Because most business expansion is financed with debt, the state 
has used the credit level to wield power over the economy by 
allocating credit to those industries it wished to encourage and 
to those companies that have performed well. Thus, success in 
exports has meant the availability of further funds for addi- 
tional export promotion, trading, importitlg, or production for 
internal purposes. Control over credit, together with state 
control over critical co-porate personnel and the financial com- 
106~a0, op. cit. 
107~he figures for the rise in female participation in the labor 
force seem low, but the general characteristic of younger women 
leaving the force after marriage means there has been a great 
turnover of women entering and leaving. 
og. cit. 
position of corporations, has allowed the executive branch to 
dominate the economy. 
It is significant that curb market debt as a percentage of 
total liabilities is dire-tly related to firm size. In 1977, 
firms with 5-9 employees nad curb market debts of 14.1 percent, 
but firms with over 200 employees had only 2.1 percent. Overall 
debt (liabilities compared to net worth) was 30.6 percent for the 
5-9 employee firm, but 265.4 percent for the 200-299 employee 
firm and 349.3 percent for firms with 300 employees or more.109 
The conglomerates have an average paid-in capital of 18.1 per- 
cent, and their debt-equity ratio in 1983 was 455 percent, com- 
pared with 360 percent for the whole manufacturing sector. There 
are some who regard this as indicative of a weak industrial 
structure. 
There has not been equity in access to business opportunity 
in Korea. It has been the clear palicy of the Government to pro- 
vide support to the chaebol (conglomerates). Economically, this 
has been a very successful policy, and it is argued by some that 
Korea's deft management of the 1979 oil crisis and political tur- 
moil after Park's assassination was due to the operation of the 
chaebol and their diversified investments. In terms of access to 
the marketplace, this of course has given these companies the 
major advantage of being the chosen instrument of Korean economic 
(and foreign) policy, with the ability to expand even more widely 
and rapidly. The U . S .  Government has noted that some of its 
assistance that was intended for small and medium industries in 
fact went to large concerns and that the intended beneficiaries 
were not assisted to the degree anticipated. 
Although there is a vibrant private sector, with high levels 
of corporate expansion (and failure), it has remained under the 
thumb of government. In this sense, equitable access to credit 
has not been evident in Korean society. The donors have done 
little to change this situation and, through support to various 
development banks, have fostered this pattern. 
Environmental degradation has social and economic costs for 
equity, and in this area the record of the Korean Government is 
mixed. The early quest for industrialization a d  fur the spread 
of foreign investment prompted the state to illnore the environ- 
ment. At least one report by foreign consultants warning of 
environmental degradation was suppressed and its contents never 
released. 
The result was widespread air and water pollution from 
industrial plants (and in urban areas from automobiles;. In some 
cases, irrigation water could not be used because of its toxic 
effect on rice plants. There is also the unknown degree to which 
the extensive use of herbicides (to cut labor costs), pesticides, 
and fertilizer may have affected the health of rural populations. 
Since that early period of export expansion, however, there 
has been a concerted Government effort to protect and improve 
some environmental conditions. The reforestation program in 
Korea has altered the landscape; it may be the only successful 
national reforestation program in the world. More stringent 
pollution control mechanisms may be in place. However, the 
author has seen no data indicating that donor-supported projects 
have been turned down for their potential negative environmental 
impact. It is important to note that donor support for sewage 
and waste disposal treatment facilities are positive elements on 
donors' environmental records. 
The final economic aspect of equity is the sharing of the 
tax burden. Tax statistics in most countries may be severely 
limited because of evasion and collection problems. Korea is no 
different, but there seems a general consensus among observers 
that Korea has not introduced a particularly progressive tax 
structure. It is certainly not designed to redistribute income, 
nor, as in some other states, does it attempt to limit access to 
the affluent community. It is, rather, formulated to promote 
savings and reduce evasions and distortions. 
Korea relies more on import and other duties and taxes on 
luxuries than many other states. Although farm income is not 
normally subject to taxation, how does one account for the 
"voluntary" donation of funds or labor for the myriad - Saemaul 
(New Community) projects that dot village landscapes? Such 
contributions do not enter the tax statistics. 
A value-added tax (VAT) was introduced in 1977, designed to 
replace a more complex series of taxes and exert a favorable 
influence on exports. However, the issue of the regressive 
nature of the VAT continues to be fervently debated. There is no 
question that the burden of the VAT has fallen more heavily on 
those with lowest income rather than those with the highest 
income, and on nonfarm families rather than farm families. 
Statistics vary, but estimates range from a burden of 2.42 per- 
cent to 3.91 percent for those with higher incomes, to 3.62 per- 
cent to 9.38 percent for those with lowest incomes. The 
farm/nonfarm ratios are 2.90 and 3.82 percent, respectively, for 
the higher income groups, to 8.44 and 9.38 percent for those with 
lowest income, respectively. 110 
The tax burden does not appear to have fallen on any one 
particular group, although as in most societies the wage earners 
are most likely to be taxed because their income is most obvious, 
The audit and accountancy functions do not, for example, deal 
with the conglomerates as a unit, but rather with their indivi- 
dual components, which may allow these firms more flexibility in 
dealing with their tax obligations. Further, the Government 
always has at its disposal the explicit threat of tax audits to 
encourage corporations to follow governmental guidance. 
Aside from early donor efforts to encourage the Government 
to improve its tax collection, and some technical assistance in 
this field, the tax issue, except insofar as subsidies can be 
considered as a form of negative tax, has essentially been 
ignored by the donor community. Of course, income redistribution 
can come about through targeted government expenditures and 
through the tax system, and such rural subsidies are one form of 
attempted, and successful, income redistribution, 
Rural Income and Rural-Urban Differentials 
Most developing nations that are predominantly agricultural 
predicate their development strategy on an agriculture-first 
policy: this is also the policy of some bilateral donors such as 
the United States. Korea, however, opted for a different path-- 
using the surpluses generated through exports produced in urban 
areas to fuel agricultural growth. It is evident that for over 
two decades the governments of Korea felt that they could afford 
to slight the rural sector. They were assisted in this approach 
by the predominant donor over much of that period, the United 
States. 
The early conception, perhaps for the decade beginning with 
liberation, that South Korea's future lay in agriculture, was 
based on assumptions that were both natural and inaccurate. It 
was true that South Korea was more agricultural than North Korea, 
and the pre-World War I1 record demonstrated that Korea could be 
a food surplus state and could export food grains to Japan. What 
the latter conclusion obscured was that Korea did this through 
f-rced Japanese rice procurement by drastically ~urtai?i'~q 
domestic consumption and by substituting other (inferic ! grains 
l l o ~ w a n ~  Choi, Value Added Taxation: Experiences and Lessons of 
Korea, Working Paper No. 84-06 (Seoul: Korea Development 
Institute, March 19841, pp. 47-49. 
as rice went to fuel Japan's military expansion. The Nathan 
Report of 1952 thus recommended that Korea adopt a development 
strategy that would focus on agricultural exports.111 It was 
never implemented. 
The poor economic investment possibilities in rural areas 
and the generally conservative nature of the peasant population 
after the Korean War (there had been considerable radicalization 
of farmers following liberation and before land reform) allowed 
the governments of Syngman Rhee, Chang Myon, and Park Chung Hee 
for the first decade of his rule, essentially to ignore the rural 
sector in favor of placating the potentially mercurial political 
views of a growing urban people. Thus, consumer prices of 
staples were held down to keep possible urban economic unrest 
under control. 
The United States, through its PL 480 program, was able to 
provide surplus foods to Kcrea on a grant basis. These grains, 
mostly wheat and rice, (cottcn was also important for textile 
mills, and its supply was about half of PL 480 imports) were then 
sold on the local market, the local currency generated providing 
much of the revenue of the Korean Government. Between 1955 and 
1971, the value of these imports totaled $777.6 million (an addi- 
tional $436.1 million was provided by loan agreements between 
1968 and 1973) .I12 This was a short-term ameliorative mechanism 
that was in the longer run destructive of sounder economic 
planning. The program met U.S. national objectives in a quite 
limited sense: it immed;ately disposed of U.S. grain surpluses; 
it established a commercial market for U.S. products (Korea, 
which was 36 percent self-sufficient in wheat in 1961, is now 2 
percent self-sufficient and is supplied essentially from the 
United States; cotton production, which was important, is now 
virtually nonexistent in Korea); and it assisted general U.S. 
foreign policy objectives, which were to support the Korean 
Government and people. It has been said that PL 480 was the 
principal means to carry out donor objectives: "Based on the 
size of the program and the control which the U.S. may exercise 
over the use of local currency generations, it can be said that 
the Title I [PL 4801 program has become the principal economic 
tool through which U S.  foreign policy objectives in Korea are 
being carried out. "li3 
lll~obert R. Nathan Associates, "Preliminary Report on the Economic 
Reconstruction of Korea," December 15, 1952. 
l l * ~ n  additional $433.8 million in food was imported for feeding 
programs but not for resale. 
1 1 3 ~ ~ 0  Report, 1972, op. cit. 
Yet this aid program destroyed any Korean Government ini- 
tiative to improve rice and barley production through pricing 
policies that provided a fair return on imputed investment. 
Until the late 1960s, the overall costs of production of rice 
(including imputed labor costs) were in excess of the Government 
purchase price, which altho~gh not a monopoly, was sufficient to 
control the market .ll& Farmers grew rice under such conditions 
for a variety of reasons: they needed it for substance, it was 
customary, and they did not value their labor as there were few 
economic alternative uses of their time. 
There were several factors that caused the Park Government 
to change its policy toward the rural sector. Park had been 
under pressure in 1967 from opposition politicians to provide 
assistance to the rural population; PL 480 in the late 1960s was 
changed from a grant program to hard currency (although con- 
cessionall loans; and when in the 1971 election his sources of 
support were severely eroded in the rural areas, the Government 
resolved to take action. The result was increased grain prices 
to farmers, more rural infrastructure, and the Saernaul (New 
Community) Movement. This period coincides with the spread of 
the new high-yielding varieties of rice that markedly increased 
yields. Since that experience, however, Korea has learned that 
the traditional rice varieties respond to the same treatment as 
the newer high- ielding varieties, often within 10 percent of 
total yields. 11s 
Since the export drive began after the coup of Park Chung 
Hee in 1961, and especially after the infusion of Japanese 
reparations and assistance following normalization of relations 
with Japan in 1965, urban salaried income began to rise as 
industry expanded and urban labor shortages occurred. Rural 
incomes, however, remained depressed by the low prices for the 
basic foodgrains of rice and barley. 
Although pricing levels were to continue to be low for a 
long time, the regime, following foreign technical assistance 
provided by AID, reformed the agricultural bureaucracy by forming 
the Office of Rural Develo ment, incorporating research and 
extension into one system.Yl6 The Government also consolidated 
the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, providing the 
basic bureaucratic structure that was to allow expansion of agri- 
cultural programs when the political will was ready. 
114~ee Ban et al. 
115~ee Steinberg et al., Korean --- Agricultural Services. 
1161bid. 
The decisions to improve income and performance in the agri- 
cultural sector were not only predicated on positive shifts in 
grain pricing but also on a coordinated effort at rural mobiliza- 
tion that resulted in an infusion of funds into rural infrastruc- 
ture, such as irrigation, roads, and electricity, all of which 
were supported in part by foreign economic assistance and were 
essential components of enhanced rural equity.117 
It was fortunate that at the time the Third Five-Year Plan 
was being formulated, calling for increased attention to rural 
development, the new high-yielding varieties of rice were being 
introduced and tested in Korea. The results were an extension 
service in place, widespread irrigation, fertilizer availability 
(through foreign assistance),ll* and credit mechanisms working 
(also partly supported by foreign aid) that enabled the rural 
economy to take advantage of the new seed varieties. 
The confluence of political will, technological innovations, 
and the administrative mechanisms produced an explosion of pro- 
duction that, by 1976, raised Korean rice production to the 
highest level per hectare in the world, for a short period even 
surpassing Japan. The goals achieved were not only economic but 
also political and strategic, but they were short lived. 
Political expediency to attain the political goal of rice self- 
sufficiency pushed too far and too fast varieties of rice that 
Korean researchers warned would eventually fail. They did fail 
in the disastrous crop year of 1980, a failure officially attri- 
buted to cold weather. The literal truth of that assertion, 
however, obscured the political and administrative ramifications 
of the decision to proceed with a single variety ill-suited to 
the varying climatic conditions in Korea. It was ironically a 
testament to the capacity of the Korean bureaucracy, which ably 
implemented such a decision, hotsever inappropriate it may have 
been. 119 
The Koreans, with their high-picing policy resulting in 
producer rice prices over two tines the world market price, were 
quietly following a successful Japanese model; but where the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Japan required the support of 
the farm bloc to continue in power, the Korean Government, from 
an outside perspective, seemed under no such pressure. To pla- 
cate the urban population, consumer prices of these grains were 
also held down. Thus, the Government found itself through the 
Grain Management Fund supporting subsidies for both the rural and 
117see Steinberg et al., Korean Agricultural Services. 
lla~ee Steinberg et al., Korean Agricultural Services. 
119~ee Steinberg et al., Korean Agricultural Services. 
urban populations, a situation that would eventually prove econo- 
mically intolerable. 
The deficit was financed by an expansion of the money 
supply, thus fueling inflation in which the whole society would 
pay the costs of these subsidies. In opposition to the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Economic Planning Board staff 
resolved to cut the deficit. The IBRD structural adjustment loan 
of October 1983, as one of the conditions and supporting 
widespread concerns previously expressed by Korean planners, 
called for the elimination of these subsidies by the end of the 
Fifth Five-Year Plan in 1986. 
Subsidization of grain prices through the Grain Management 
Fund by 1983 cumulatively reached $1.7 billion. In addition, the 
fertilizer subsidization had accumulated deficits of $700 
million. 
Contrary to some published figures, farm household income 
had lagged far behind urban household income (the comparison be- 
tween farm household income and urban salaried income was not 
quite valid). Between 1965 and 1970, when the export drive was 
entering high gear, average income of urban and salary wage- 
earner hoilseholds rose in real terms by 14.1 ercent and daily 
wage-earner household income by 15.1 percent .P20 In contrast, 
farm household income only rose by 4.6 percent during this time. 
In the 1970-1975 pe~iod, after grain prices were raised and 
the high-yielding varieties of rice began to be distributed, farm 
income rose more quickly than urban salary and wage-earner house- 
holds (6.5 percent compared with 2.3 percent), partly as a result 
of the first oil price increase and its effect on the urban econ- 
omy. From 1975 to 1979, the growth pattern was again reversed: 
farm income rose by 5.7 percent, whereas urban salary and wage 
household income increased 12.7 percent. Urban daily wage-earner 
households, however, essentially equaled farming household 
income. Overall, urban households continued to be more affluent 
than rural ones, for the effective exclusion of most academi- 
cians, businessmen, higher civil servants, and professionals from 
the statistics markedly skewed the comparison. 
Since that time, it is likely that disparities between the 
urban salaried worker households and farm households have grown. 
Although a greater proportion of farm households receive income 
from nonfarming sources (especially from urban remittances), the 
disastrous harvest of 1980 and the freeze in rice and barley pri- 
ces in 1983 mean that farm income will probably continue to 
120~hese and the following figures are from John Slaboda (personal 
communication). 
decline in constant currency due to inflation and that the elimi- 
nation of the subsidies of the Grain Management Fund by 1986 will 
see a further decline in rural-urban equity in the rural sector. 
A move by Korean farmers out of rice and into high-priced spe- 
cialty crops would help solve the issue, but it is currently 
illegal and would likely be politically and emotionally trauma- 
tic. Elimination of the land-holding ceiling would allow 
increased farm income, but for fewer farmers, with the remaicder 
driven off the land into the cities. Urban employment would thus 
have to continue expanding. 
The Korean Government is well aware of the need, under pre- 
sent and likely circumstances, to increase the proportion of 
nonagricaltural income of rural inhabitants. In 1962, 20.4 per- 
cent of rural income came from nonfarm sources, including wages 
(9.4 percent), remittances (7.2 percent), and other businesses 
(3.8 percent). By 1981, 32.8 percent of rural household income 
was from nonfarm sources, inclllding 19.9 percent from remittances 
and savings. The highest off-farm income is, naturally in fami- 
lies with less than 0.5 hectare (64.0 percent in 1981). 121 1n 
Japan, the figure is 80 percent and in Taiwan, 73.6 percent.122 
The potential for such growth, however, is limited because of a 
lack of appropriate institutional financing (essentially a mono- 
poly of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation) for 
nonfarm employment opportunities at the village level. 
The failure of the Saemaul industrial program, which sub- 
sidized the establishment of 741 factories and was designed to 
introduce labor-intensive industries in rural areas in the 
mid-1970s, was due to its quick formation as a political impera- 
tive; and its export orientation occurred just when there was a 
slump in the world market and internal transportation costs were 
high. One-third of these small factories, often branches of 
larger concerns, closed and most of the remainder operated at low 
capacity as they were not competitive with the larger concerns. 
Nothing has yet replaced them. 
It should also be noted that the recent decline in rural 
income is reflected in two other statistics: the rise in rural 
indebtedness and the increase in tenancy. Rural indebtedness, 
before the agrarian policy changes, in 1965 stood at 106 percent 
of current farm assets (including land values). At the height of 
the agricultural success in 1976 when rice production (49 percent 
121se.e Kim Jong Gie, Rural Industrialization in Korea: Current 
Status and Future Policy Directions, working Paper No. 83-08 
(Seoul: Korea Development Institute, September 19831, pp. 7-8. 
Also, Steinberg et al, , Korean Agricultural Services. 
of gross farm receipts) peaked, it dropped to 20 percent, but by 
1982 it had once again risen to 94 percent.123 At the sane 
time, tenancy has been on the increase, so that by 1981, 46 per- 
cent of farmers were complete or partial tenants, and 22 percent 
of the land area was tenanted. 
Growing pressures to increase the statutory limit on land 
size, which would make mechanization more feasible and thus 
increase the productivity of rural labor (but not necessarily 
total proauction), would also probably result in heightened 
disparities in income distribution within the rural sector. 
Rural incomes are likely to further decline, as farm income 
is still largely dependent on rice. Significant off-farm 
employment is still a distant prospect, and continuing migration 
of youth (both male and female) into urban jobs seems likely with 
the aging of the Korean farm family. This, without compensatory 
facLors, would probably lead to lower productivity, but the 
Government will continue to attempt to offset this with mechani- 
zation. Although grain and fertilizer subsidies may be lessened 
or eliminated, there remains considerable subsidization by 
Government in other aspects of the rural sector, including irri- 
gation, roads, mechanization, and credit. 
The donors' response to the rural inequities in Korea have 
been one that essentially followed Korean Government's policies. 
Except for one irrigation loan each, the multilateral donors did 
not invest in the rural sector until Korea emphasized it in 1971. 
The United States only provided $36 million in grants directly 
for agriculture and natural resource development between 1954 and 
1975, although an indeterminate but substantial amount went for 
rural activities under loans and under general support to the 
Korean budget. Because of the PL 480 program, the United States 
can justly be charged with exacerbating rural inequities, but in 
other fields the donors simply accepted Government program direc- 
tion. 
3.4 Regionalism and Equity 
The patterns of regionalism in South Korea are too per- 
sistent to be ignored. Dating back to the period of the Three 
Kingdoms in Korea (unified in 668  A . D . ) ,  there has been some 
social discrimination between those from the Cholla provinces in 
the southwest and the remainder of the country. These have becn 
marginal differences in perspective, but they became of greater 
importance politically because the opposition to Syngman Rhee was 
centered in that area. From the Third Republic on, these two 
provinces were also regarded as the seat of opposition to the 
Government. This culminated in the Kwangju insurrection in May 
1980, which was forcibly suppressed by the Government, with many 
lives lost. There were charges that the southwest had been 
discriminated against in the introduction of highways and 
industrial development. 
There is some evidence for this. Part of it, no doubt, came 
from the better port facilities of the southezst (the southwest 
being largely agricultural with shallow harbors), and also 
because, as in most develo~ing nations, rapid economic growth 
usrally occurs in the capital and its surrounding area. Regard- 
less, there was perceived economic discrimination. Tt may be 
significant that the failure of Saemaul rural industry in the 
Cholla provinces was over double that in the more favored 
Xyungsang provinces (Presidents Park and Chun are from this 
region) of the southeast. Income was also skewed. In 1968, for 
example, per capita income in Seoul and Pusan was over double 
that of the Cholla provinces and income in Kyungsang provinces 
was about one-fifth higher.124 Further, these disparities had 
been growing. Rural industry in 1970 in Chollanam and Chollabuk 
Provinces was 17.8 and 11.2 percent, respectively, of all 
national rural industry; by 1980, it had dropped to 12.9 and 7.5 
percent, respectively (employment had also fallen to 7.4 and 3.1 
percent, respectively). Gn the other hand, Kyonggyi Province 
(around Seoul) had doubled its industry over the same period to 
30.6 percent of national industry, and Kyonggyi Province in 1980 
had also ex anded to encompass 27.7 percent of rural industrial 
employment. P25 
The bulk of industry in Korea is located in the Seoul. area 
and the surrounding province of Kyonggyi, and then in the 
southeast, especially in or near the cities of Pusan, Taegu, 
Masan, Ulsan, and Pohang. It is not surprising that a review of 
the funds provided by the IBRD and the ADB to various banks for 
relending to industry indicates that only perhaps 5 percent went 
to the Chollas, which have about one-fifth of the national popu- 
lation. 
In that sense the donors were following the lead of the 
Government and reinforcing these disparities. how eve^, there has 
been a persistent effort by some donors, especially the IBRD, to 
124~ertrand Renaud, "Conflicts Between National Growth and Regional 
Incomz Equality in a Rapidly Growing Economy: The Case of 
Korea," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 21, 3 (April 
1973). 
125~irn Jong Gie, pp. 13-14. 
engage in regional development, and it is to the credit of the 
IBR3 that its focus on the Kwangju region has been longstanding. 
Figures on donor support to rural infrastructure, such as roads 
and irrigation, show no evidence that the donors intentionally 
exacerbated the discrepancies that already existed. Although 
donors could greatly influence how their funds were spent, they 
could not effectively control them, for the recipient's own 
resources were by far the overwhelming proportion of monies 
available. Donor lending was provided to those areas where it 
made sense economically, following Korean Government leads. Such 
lending was designed neither to alleviate income differences nor 
to correct past deficiencies, and it accomplished neither. 
3.5 Aspects of Social Equity 
There has been general improvement in social services 
throughout Korea and the introduction of social security. In 
addition to the equitable spread and accessibility of higher 
levels of education, both by region and by gender, electricity 
reaches most of the remote rural homes on the peninsula, and o ~ l y  
a few isolated islands are without it. Rural electrification has 
generally been a consumption rather than a production good in the 
rural setting, as little use is made of it for farm-level produc- 
tive enterprises. Its grimary functions seem to be for lighting, 
television, and fans. (In the sense that Government zontrols all 
the media, from the state's viewpoint it is also a political 
good.) Water and sanitation have greatly expanded in urban areas 
and, to a lesser degree, in rural areas. The IBRD, ADB, and, 
earlier, AID have all given major support to improved sewage and 
water supplies for the major urban areas. There has lately also 
been an increase in donor support to water and waste treatment in 
the smallsr urban communities. Safe water is now said to be 
available to 85 percent of urban and 55 percent of rural house- 
holds. 
There has also been a general improvement in health and 
nutrition. The average life expectancy has risen from 54 years 
in 1960 to 63 years in 1982, infant mortality has dropped from 62 
to 37 per thousand live births, and although the Government 
spends only a small percentage of its annual budget on health, 
the availability of services has increased. In rural areas, this 
has been not so much a product of better hospitals, preventive 
care, or medical services, but rather a result of improved rural 
transportation (roads, buses, and taxis), together with telephone 
service, so that in emergencies, transportation to a hospital is 
possible. As in most developing countries, doctors are con- 
centrated in major urban areas, but medical personnel now may 
serve in provincial areas in lieu of military service. The 
population-doctor ratio fell from 3,539 in 1960 to 1,986 in 1982. 
The ratio of population to hospital beds has also declined signi- 
ficantly from 2,482 in 1960 to 643 in 1982. Most health expen- 
ses, however, are privately financed, with only 15 percent of 
total gross health expenditures borne by government, which also 
controls only 13.1 percent of health care institutions and 18.7 
percent of hospital beds. 126 Nutrition standards are well over 
the daily requirements for both the whole population and sub- 
groups, although traditioqal child-feeding patterns, which are 
nutritionally poor, are generally retained. 
Although there is evidence127 that mobility has been limit- 
ed at the apex of the economic and social ladder, except through 
the military channel, there is considerable mobility in the econ- 
omy at the lower and middle levels. The expansion of economic 
activity has, of course, required this, but it has been assisted 
through the activities of donors that have strengthened the tech- 
nical educational system. This has allowed mobilia-y through an 
alternative channel to the prestigious academic system that nor- 
mally dominates a Confucian-oriented society. In this sense, the 
donors, especially the World Bank, have furthered the process by 
supporting many of the institutions contributing to such mobility 
and the development of such skills. 
The issue of pa-rticipation, brcadly defined as the involve- 
ment in the economic and allocational decision process of those 
whom development affects--in contrast to the overall political 
process of choosing national or local leadership--is one that has 
flowered for three short periods i.1 Korean history. These eras 
followed liberation from Japan in 1945, the overthrow of Syngman 
Rhee in 1960, and the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979. 
Each was an intensely participatory period verging on the 
chaotic, and each began to unloosen the encumbering strands of 
state control, only to be followed by a reaffirmation of the 
centralized power of the political leadership. 
Korea has had a strong heritage of central control. People 
generally believe that power is finite; to share or delegate it 
is to diminish proportionally one's own. It may be argued that 
the pervasiveness of state control was one factor in reta-ding 
the development of major entrepreneurial investment or industry 
in thz classical period. This tendency was reinforced by the 
Japanese colonial period and, inadvertently, by the U.S. military 
government. 
126~orea Development Institute, Development Strategy and Policy 
Priorities for the Fifth ~ive-year Development Plan, Working 
Paper No. 8003 (Seoul: Korea Developm~nt Institute, April 19801, 
12'~ones and SaKong, op. cit. 
The extent of central Government (it should be remembered 
the all local government is appointed and is an arm of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, which also controls the police) inter- 
vention into the economic, social, and cultural lives, let alone 
the political process, is ubiquitous. The regulatory functions 
of the state intrude into the daily lives of every citizen, 
controlling much of the mundane aspects of living, especially in 
rural communities. The anonimity of urban Korea is in contrast 
to the rural areas and may be one of its attractions, more 
because of the removal of some Confucian strictures than because 
of political influence. 
Some have argued that despite the heavy hand of government 
in rural development through the Saemaul Movement, citizens have 
a greater share in the process than before. This may be true, 
but it is the concept of a limited role within effectively sta- 
tist regulations and objectives. 
As the economy has expanded and become more complex, there 
have been pressures of sheer efficiency to release some of the 
bonds of state regulation. This has included some pressures from 
abroad, and planned liberalization of imports, the operation of 
both foreign and domestic banks, and more generally the func- 
tioning of the economy. These forces for liberalization are real 
and have been generally supported by foreign donors, Korea's 
trading partners, and many of Korea's trained economists. 
Although there are those who favor liberalization, vested 
interests and bureaucratic inertia are likely to slow such pro- 
cesses. 
Donors have often suggested policies of macroeconomic liber-. 
alization, and the Korean Government has slowly moved in this 
direction, more likely because it perceived it to be in Korea's 
own interests rather than because it was abstractly desirable. 
The Government has done so when its political and economic power 
base either was not threatened or could be enhanced by such 
moves. The Fifth Five-Year Plan, in which more reliance on 
market mechanisms is advocated, is such an example. 
There seems little question that liberalization will con- 
tinue, but it is likely to do so in a slow, episodic manner. The 
donors' contribution to the process is evident in some fields, 
such as helping encourage the Government to play less of a domi- 
nant role in pricing, but the historic tendency in Korea points 
in the direction of centralization. 
3.6 The Status of Women 
The development process in Korea has provided Korean women 
with increasing opportunities to work, but discriminated against 
them in wages and status. Female participation in the labor 
force has grown, but not as rapidly as a percentage of the labor 
force as one might expect. This is due to the pattern of women 
entering the urban job market and working only until they are 
married or until their first child is born. There is thus a 
constant turnover in female labor supply, with female par- 
ticipation in light industries, such as textiles and electronic 
assembly, very important to those fields. Women in the work 
force are generally young. In 1973, 82 percent of all women in 
the modern labor force were between 18 and 29 years old, and over 
88 percent of all female clerical workers were under 2 4  years, as 
were 64 percent of all women in manufacturing. In larger firms, 
the women are often housed by their factory. Income is con- 
sidered supplemental to general family income, and wages are 
shared with the whole family or saved as dowry, In 1978, female 
wages were only 46 percent of male wages. Although there is no 
statistical evidence, it seems likely that rural women enter the 
urban labor force not only for the remuneration but secondarily 
for the mobility associated with leaving the rural community, the 
desire to escape from the rigid confines of the Confucian village 
society, and to marry into urban households. Women interviewed 
said that they did not want their daughters to marry farmers. 
There are few women in the higher levels of government; for 
example, there is only one woman in the Economic Planning Board 
in a supervisory role. 
Women have fared poorly at the farm level even with rising 
incomes, for their work has increased while the family labor 
associated with the farm has diminished. Women have taken on 
nontraditional roles in some occupations, and there has been a 
growing number of women ir. higher education. Avenues for women 
are still restricted, aithough Korean women may have progressed 
further, from a very low beginning, than the other women of 
northeast Asia. 
The donorst role (after early military government assistance 
in education) has been essentially neutral. Insofar as develop- 
ment has opened up employment opportunities for women, and donors 
have contributed to such possibilities, their contribution has 
been useful but essentially inadvertent. No major donor seems to 
have consciously designed projects or offered assistance that 
would have positively enhanced the status of women, although some 
small foundations have tried to do so. 
Women are still disadvantaged in Korea. Despite past 
constitutional provisions specifically indicating their equal 
status with men, this is still ignored both in fact and in law. 
Positive change, however, is likely over time. 
3.7 Equity and Foreign Assistance 
The contribution of donors, especially the United States, to 
the relief of Korea after World War I1 and the relief and 
rehabilitation after the Korean War was both positive and criti- 
cal to Korea's survival. It is important to qualify this, 
however. Although foreign relief assistance was effective, it 
was not in the hands of the Korean Government, but was admin- 
istered largely by the donor. That situation is unlikely to 
offer many lessons germane to other nations, as the Korean 
experience may have been unique. 
Equity is highlv valued in parts of Korean society, despite 
its hierarchical structure. This may in part be due to the 
Confucian concept of literati (i,e,, bureaucratic and intellec- 
tual) responsibility for ensuring the health of the state, 
coupled with modern student (i.e., younger literati) concerns 
with social affairs. It may also have been affected by the 
remarkable growth af Christianity over the past two decades. 
Donors have had an important influence on equity policy in 
Korea, but it occurred prior to the formation of the Korean 
Government, The single greatest foreign contribution to equity 
in the country was the land reform carried out under foreiqn 
military government auspices and based on foreign models. It no 
doubt was profoundly important to equity in Korea, and remains so 
today, despite some erosion in its effect. This is an out- 
standing achievement of a particular type of foreign assistance 
that is unlikely to be replicated in many places and certainly 
not under similar conditions. Land reform in all analyses of 
Korean income distribution is regarded as elemental to rural 
equity, and may be similarly considered in many other nations. 
Equity issues are so largely related to policy and to the 
distribution of power that, if Korea is any example, both rela- 
tively weak but authoritarian governments and strong nationalist 
ones will try by varying tactics to control policy and shape the 
equity issues to their own interests. Syngman Rhee did so by 
manipulating one bureaucratic element of the donor against 
another, each having differing parochial interests. Bilateral 
donors are more subject to this sort of alternating pressures 
than multilateral donors. It should be mentioned here that the 
Japanese aid program has not at any time attempted to influence 
or shift policies related to equity. They have accepted with 
apparent equanimity this aspect of the status quo in Korea. 
There is no evidence that the Korean Government made any 
concessions either to donor policies as contained in the donor's 
own regulations (e.g., the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 in the 
United States, concentrating assistance on the rural poor) or to 
donor requests for reforms leading to more equitable distribution 
of the benefits of development until the Korean Government per- 
ceived it was in its own interests to do so. 
There thus is no indication that the donors, either through 
project or program assistance and without regard to the magnitude 
of funds, had any significant impact on improving equity by 
prompting changes in Korean Government policies. One might iron- 
ically speculate that this is to be expected when professional 
economists, Korean and foreign, talk to each other, for they 
share a common set of academic values. When the Korean Govern- 
ment made such changes, however, donors supported those shifts 
through their projects. 
The reverse seems apparent as well. Policy changes in 
~quity as suggested by donors have been ignored on the rare occa- 
sions when they have been proferred. Despite repeated exhor- 
tations by the United States to reform its agricultural policy to 
provide better livings to Korean farmers, the Government did not 
do so until it became evident to elements of that Govexnment that 
to continue to neglect the rural sector would lead to further 
ercsion of the power base of the regime. 
It is also significant, insofar as equity is related to par- 
ticipation, that the donors have had no effect on improving par- 
ticipation in Korean society, which remains minimal. Local 
government remains appointed, not elected. The participatory 
nature cf the Saemaul Movement, sometimes cited as democratic in 
concept., is open to disputz, as there is an indistinct line be- 
tween mobilization and participation. What is apparent, however, 
is that whatever the degree of local participation, it was devel- 
oped and sanctioned by the Government of Korea at its own pace 
and in its own way. 
There may be an indirect effect on equity policy by par- 
ticipant training through foreign assistance, but it cannot be 
demonstrated except in individual circumstances. In any effort 
to build up a critical mass of officials or technicians over 
time, they may positively affect policy as they rise in the 
bureaucracy. Although there may be an indirect relationship to 
the donors, it is virtually impossible to quantify and is tenuous 
at best. 
The persistent policy discussions that occur between advi- 
sers and officials over prolonged periods may eventually have 
some effect, but it is impossible to trace such causality with 
any certainty. This type of dialogue is desirable but is pro- 
bably impossible to evaluate. 
Once the Government has decided on a course of action, how- 
ever, or if the matter under consideration is technical, donors 
may have a profound influence within these important strictures. 
Thus bilateral donors can help effect the equitable allocation of 
credit once it is decided which organization will control it, how 
to raise incomes and yields through technological improvements in 
industry or agriculture, and other project-level activities. 
The greatest contribution to overall equity in Korea by 
donors has probably been the overall support of the industrial 
sector, as evidenced by the large number of jobs created. Such 
donor community support may have provided the tacit assurances 
that enabled commercial markets to extend the credit that created 
even more employment, which is a primary, positive factor in 
improved equity in Korea. 
4 .  CONCLUSIONS 
Korea began the process of economic development with dis- 
tinct noneconomic advantages (unrecognized at the time) and with 
the pall of a devastated physical infrastructure. In retrospect, 
the obvious massive destruction of the Korean War has proven to 
be less of a hindrance to economic growth than cultural homoge- 
neity, the Confucian stress on education, the concept (if 
neglected in the breach) of a meritocratic bureaucratic system, 
have been advantages. 
Korea has been able to attain a relatively equitable income 
distribution by international comparisons not as a result (until 
recently) of policy formulation, but because of its cultural 
background and a foreign-initiated and -influenced land reform. 
Tho higher education standard, light industrial base, and the 
beginnings of modernized agriculture (relative to the systems 
existing in many postcolonial societies after independence) 
together with the destruction of assets from the Korean War have 
proven advantageous to equitable income distribution. The threat 
of North Korea has proven to be as much of an economic incentive 
as it has been a military problem. 
There have, of course, been errors in priorities, in plan- 
ning, and in the equity of implementation, and strong forces for 
continued ~entralization exist despite public dicta to the 
contrary; yet the overall economic record has been enviable. 
Nevertheless, a price has been exacted for such growth in pl>liti- 
cal and social terms and economically for various elements of the 
population at different periods. Stress is likely to continue. 
Participation has been severely restricted; but economic and, to 
a lesser degree, social mobility have been evident. The country 
has become economically unified but regional income and invest- 
ment disparities still exist. 
The unique circumstances of Korean culture and history and 
the events surrounding its growth preclude the wholesale adoption 
of the Korean model of development, or indeed any of its inter- 
connected components, to other countries. Yet, certain features 
stand out from which one may abstract generalized conclusions 
about development and the roles of donor agencies and from which 
one might attempt to draw lessons that might improve the manage- 
ment of the development process. These issues are the subjects 
of the next two sections of this essay. 
4.1 Aid Effectiveness 
The most prosaic "definitionu of effectiveness is limited to 
funding "issues. It has certain credibility only internal to 
organizations that view their essential--as opposed to titular-- 
function as spending funds efficiently and completely and in a 
volume prescribed by internal demands. Such a narrow definition 
implies the following evaluative questions: (1) were the funds 
allocated for projects or programs obligated in an expeditious 
manner for the purposes agreed upon; ( 2 )  were these (narrow) pur- 
poses achieved according to the prescribed rules; and ( 3 )  if a 
loan, were the funds repaid according to agreement? 
This definition is not adequate, but it is important, espe- 
cially to bilateral donors, given that the first (and most 
obvious) aspect of assistance may be the overall volume of aid 
that is set and promised at high political levels. Thus, there 
is a certain relief within a bureaucracy when the allocated funds 
are obligated, when the donor performs well, and when loans are 
repaid. 
In this sense, Korea has been a model recipient for two 
decades. The Japanese have commented on the total effectiveness 
of their aid program and regard Korea as the premier aid recipi- 
ent in the world in these terms. The Asian Development Bank has 
also noted that the projects have been implemented in an exem- 
plary manner, and in their analyses such terms as 'highly satis- 
factory" performance are quite common. Funds have been used at 
rates almost double the average for other countries. All World 
Bank evaluations have also expressed these themes. When there 
has been delay or cost overruns, and these have often occurred, 
these have often been a product of the donor's bureaucratic sys- 
tem rather than recipient inefficiency, or of inflation due to 
external factors, such as the international rises in the price of 
oil. There have been delays in innovative projects, but by defi- 
nition such innovation is likely to lead to slow implementation. 
Because the United States was the longest and overall the 
largest donor, and the only one that bridged the gap between the 
relief, rehabilitation, and import substitution phase of Korean 
development and the more dynamic and succersful export promotion 
era, the American experience is mixed. It is overly simplistic 
to categorize an era in a few words, but it may be said that in 
the period prior to 1961, assistance was generally not effec- 
tively used and Korean performance was poor overall. It can also 
be cogently argued that donor performance was conceptually 
limited to a rather narrow view of Korea's potential, and one 
that served the donor's interests perhaps more than the reci- 
pient's. After 1961, except for an initial period of about 2 
years when relations between Korea and the United States were 
quite strained politically (and indeed economically), that aid 
relationship was generally very effective until concessional 
assistance stopped in 1975. Not all projects supported by the 
United States succeeded; some advisory projects failed, and those 
that were successful had varying degrees of effectiveness. But 
the argument can be made for the latter period that the primary 
responsibility for not reaching specified goals may well have 
vested with the internal donor process in setting unrealistic 
targets and the articulation of specific and inflated goals a ~ 2  
purposes as aspects of a sales document, the credibility of which 
was limited to the donor's internal review procedures rather than 
the objective conditions facing the recipient. 
In summary, Korea has been an exemplary recipient in terms 
of the narrow definition of "aid effectiveness." Because "aid 
effectivenessn deals essentially with the expenditure of funds 
and the physical construction of facilities, the total scope of 
development aid is ignored in this definition. It is therefore 
necessary to review the Korean experience in technical assist- 
ance, training, and policy dialogue and to determine how Korea 
has fared in these and other categories. 
4.2 Technical Assistance and Its Effectiveness 
Technical assistance in Korea is a broader concept than its 
literal definition indicates, and it has had several overlapping 
functions that varied in importance over time. It has been used 
to provide highly specific, technological assistance either for 
shorter or longer periods, suggestions or guidance on policy 
issues transcending projects or sectors, and moral support for 
both donor and recipient. 
From the recipient's perspective, technical assistance has 
been used internally by one individual, branch, group, or 
ministry to strengthen it internally within the Korean Government 
or institution. It was sometimes viewed as providing additional 
internal prestige to an institution or even a point of view as 
well as assisting at some substantial project level. It was also 
at various times considered the means through which the donor 
would make available funds, training, surplus property, or other 
benefits in which the recipients or their institution were pri- 
marily interested. Thus, the recipient's advocacy of technical 
assistance was sometimes a lever with which to extract additional 
resources from the donor. Each of these uses was legitimate at 
the time. 
Technical assistance was also useful to the doncr, some 
times also as a lever in either the field or headquarters. When 
there were considerable doubts about the capacity of an institu- 
tion to manage a project, when some oversight was thought to be 
desirable, when real technical advice was required, or when the 
bilateral donor wished to avoid the bureaucratic onus of moni- 
toring the project with its own staff, technical assistance per- 
sonnel could be brought in under contract to fill the gap. There 
was also a certain belief, ill-founded in the view of this author 
but prevalent in Washington, that in the United States contract 
technicalm assistance through an American university (especially a 
state-supported one) would help establish a political clientele 
for continued appropriations for the foreign aid bill. 
Long-term resident technical assistance staff at the project 
level were subject to co~~siderable stress because of language and 
cultural factors. A review of the "End-of-Tourn reports, which 
once were required of all USAID technical assistance advisers, 
reveals patterns that lead to the inescapable conclusion that, 
project-level understanding of the Korean language and the opera- 
tion of the Korean bureaucratic culture was essential to effec- 
tiveness. These factors were less important, as we will see, at 
the policy level because counterparts at policy levels usually 
had international training. In projects, however, the counter- 
part Korean administrators wers generally at a lower level and, 
at least in the earlier period, were less likely to be educated 
abroad and thus know English, 
The capacity of the Koreans to absorb English (or at least 
to attempt to speak it) even without being trained abroad was 
remarkably effective compared, for example, to Japan, although 
admittedly there is no statistical evidence for this. Yet the 
methods of language instruction, which need not concern us in 
this paper, were generally so poor as to prevent any except the 
most talented from speaking it by the time they assumed positions 
in the public sector. The evidence for this is clear when a 
review is made of training programs that were designed to train 
Koreans in the United States. The delays in such programs were 
invariably related to the trainees' knowledge of enough English 
prior to their departure to pass examinations so that they could 
function effectively abroad. 
Fcreign advisers were often confused about the operation of 
the Korean bureaucracy and unclear on how to function within it. 
They soon realized that one element of a successful project was 
the personal relationships that had to be established with the 
counterpart personnel. Because few technical assistance advisers 
knew anything about Korea before they came and even fewer had a 
command of Korean, much of the advice was not effective. 
The U.S. experience in Korea demonstrates that generally the 
Koreans regarded foreign technical assistance personnel as rein- 
forcing the developmentally progressive views of Koreans within 
the bureaucracy. Without the moral encouragement and the finan- 
cial assistance that went with the technical assistance projects, 
foreign personnel would have been far less effective. Converse- 
ly, on some projects in which the sole contribution of foreign 
assistance was technical, as opposed to capital or training, it 
was likely that the advice would have had less impact. 
Overall, in the early period before there were ?any tech- 
nically trained Koreans, technical assistance staff provided 
vital advice on matters that ranged from soils to textiles. 
Insofar as they acted, rather than solely advised and trained 
staff on the job, they may have been effective. For example, 
when AID had advisers attached to the office of every provincial 
governor in the early 19609, many were regarded as eminently suc- 
cessful insofar as they assisted those governors (mostly military 
officers in that period) to attain targets set for their provin- 
ces by the central authorities. It is likely that any lessons 
that might be learned from this early period in Korean develop- 
ment would be more germane to some of the African nations that 
still lack trained manpower. 
Today, for any country in which development progress is 
being built on a firm but narrow, technically skilled group, an 
alternative to long-term resident technical assistance is the 
development of links with the international centers in fields 
such as agriculture or other types of foreign institutions that 
could provide rapid, short-term responses to articulated tech- 
nical needs in the society. It is likely that the shorter resi- 
dence periods will better focus utilization of these personnel 
while they are there, and that higher level and more acceptable 
advisers will be available for these shorter periods. It is 
important that these links be continued beyond the rather finite 
and constrained period of a project, and funds might be provided 
from donors for this purpose. 
When technical assistance advice was linked to technical 
issues, as opposed to those of policy, advisers could play an 
important role. In other words, when the Korean Government had 
decided on a general policy direction, technical assistance could 
be employed to further Korean goals so that the results were 
likely to be appropriate. The most influential example from 
Korea is that of interest rate reform in 1965, which substan- 
tially raised rates on local savings deposits, thereby causing a 
large but hidden supply of savings to come into the institutional 
lending mechanisms. It was profoundly successful -128 
The record, however, is replete with examples of "failedn 
attempts by foreign advisers to affect policy when those sug- 
gestions were not consonant with Korean Government interests as 
perceived by those wielding power. The Korean Government was 
prepared to make policy shifts when it was deemed to be in its 
own interests to do so. The magnitude of funds in these cases 
was immaterial. Greater continuity of host country personnel is 
also nore likely at the project (technical) level than at the 
policy level. Too often advisory services failed because the 
higher officials who initiated the request for such services were 
transferred and new officials were less committed to the con- 
cepts. If the Korean experience is consistent with thzt in other 
countries, then the general rule would seem to be that technical 
assistance will likely be successful when such assistance is 
strictly technical and is perceived to be in accordance with the 
direction government is already taking. Foreign advice that is 
perceived to diminish or to dilute support for the regime will 
not be implemented until that government determines it is in its 
interest to do so. If Korea is an example, then the magnitude of 
foreign assistance in such efforts is irrelevant. 
Conversely, when foreign technical advice supports the 
policy decisions underway, this advice will generally be followed 
and funding levels might speed implementation. The formation of 
the Office of Rural Development in Korea on the advice of foreign 
technicians was an important bureaucratic innovation in Korea, 
for it linked agricultural research and extension. It was also 
consonant with the Park Government's attempt to unify administra- 
tion for more effective control. 
On the other hand, for some 15 years advisers suggested to 
the Government that the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation be democratized, decentralized, and turned into real 
cooperatives, but there has been no such action, for the coopera- 
tives are an integral arm of Government power in the rural sec- 
tor. Although advisers had early suggested that agricultural 
pricing policy should be revised and that farmers should be paid 
1 2 8 ~ h e  interest rate reform "was the key factor in the drastic 
improvement of the financial interrelation ratios. The ratio of 
broadly defined money (M2) to GNP jumped to 32.7 percent at the 
end of 1969 from 8.9 percent five years before. During this 
period, the volume of time and savings deposits almost doubled 
every year and constituted the majority of the increase in total 
domestic financial assets to GNP rose from 25.2 percent to 55.5 
percent over the period." (Korea Development Institute, 
Devellopment Strategy, p. 3 8 . )  
sufficiently for their produce, the changes came only when the 
Government determined it was in its interest to do so. 
There is a third option between the short-term technical 
project adviser and the long-term resident expatriate: the 
operation of a resident, technically competent, foreign 
assistance mission in a country. In Ko.'ea, only the United 
States had a significant presence in this regard (UN assistance 
was tied to individual projects, while U.S. assistance was more 
general). Although evidence is limited, it may be concluded that 
' -  the psriod before Koreans were well trained in technical 
- octs df development, such a mission (probably far less large 
thaz z.le one in place at that time) was justified. When the 
Korears became trained, a large mission was not necessary, and it 
was difficult for an organization such as AID, because of its own 
internal bureaxratic problems, to staff such a mission with 
individuals who could uniformly equal the training of their coun- 
terparts in the Korean Gcvernment. 
Missions are expensive to run and difficult to manage effec- 
tively. Such bureaucracies tend to creatE their own internal 
work load and thus qhould be kept as sma3.1 as possible, with 
autono~~~y commensurate with their teckiical capacity. Too often 
such missions become captives of their headquarters, spending too 
little time servicing the needs of the local development com- 
munity and too much time respondin'g to external r'esiderata. 
4.3 Training 
In int2rviews, Korean administrators of a wide range of 
bilateral projects stated that the most effective part of the 
program was the international training, which often comprised 
only a small percentage of thz total funds. Although it is 
possible that. some of these anecdotal remarks may be self- 
serving, they may be valid, as similar comments have been made in 
a wide variety of countries. he singular importance of training 
was reinfcrced by the virtually unanimous views of 3enior Korean 
policy-level staff, past and present. 
The training of staff who can operate within the bureaucra- 
tic milieu of a particular society is one of the a a i ? ~  longer 
term contribut,ons that any aid organization, mulzi b,-.:erll or 
bilateral, can make to a nation at a certain stage c .  its devel- 
opment. 
Korea, since liberation, has produced a substantlal flow of 
self-directed and self-supported individuals, largely from the 
gentry, who received graduate degrees abroad. In addition, 
however, Tome 3,000 Koreans were traiued abroad for shorter or 
longer periods by the United States alone, 86 percent of whom 
went to the United statesW1*9 Many of these were for short- 
term, observational courses, although a substantial number were 
for long-term degree training. Of 2,148 participants trained by 
AID between fiscal years 1954 and 1962, 15 percent were in agri- 
culture, 18 percent in administration, 8 percent in transpor- 
tation, and 25 percent in industry and mining. Of these, 46 
percent were from government, 43 percent from nationalized 
industries, and only 6 percent from the private business sector. 
There were complaints that too few individuals tad been trained 
from the private sector. 130 
The effectiveness of foreign assistance depends on the 
trained staff of any local institution. It is unfortunate, 
however, and perhaps unnecessary that the training of key indivi- 
duals to be associated with projects can only begin after project 
approval, thus creating a hiatus between project startup and 
local effective administration. This made the use of expatriate 
technical assistance necessary (at an earlier stage of Korea's 
development). Thought should be given to development of staff 
training in priority fields prior to formal project approval. 
Although there are obvious probiems associated with such an 
approach, especially when loans are involved, there may be ways 
around such an impasse. 
Senior officials of the Korean Government have persuasively 
argued that the early stress on training and human resource 
development by the donor (the United States) was the critical 
factor in later economic growth, despite this factor's relegation 
to a rather low priority by Syngman Rhee, who wanted more physi- 
cal and tangible signs of foreign assistance. U.S. assistance 
for training abroad and human resource development projects 
internally were, they have argued, a vital element in the future 
developmental success in Korea. 
A significant gap in the training program of the United 
States was the absence in the 1950s of any donor attempt to train 
economists who could later be associated with economic planning, 
although economists were trained through self-senerated or unof- 
ficial programs. Although such planning was not occurring within 
the Korean govern men^ at that time, it should have been apparent 
that the need for slich individuals would eventually arise. It 
was not until the i960s, after the military government had 
started its First Five-Year Plan, that a change in training 
priorities took place. In this sense, the Koreans were the 
leaders in this field, whereas the donor lagged behind. 
I ~ ~ A I D ,  Department of State, Evaluation Survey of the Korea/U.S. 
Participant Training Program 1955-1960, September 1963. 
1 3 0 ~ ~ 0 ,  "Report to the U.S. Congress," 1972. 
4.4 Policy Dialogue 
For a dialogue to take place on development policy, a peer 
relationship between the two nations or individuals is required. 
What one &nay lack in training or knowledge of the international 
economic scene may be compensated for by other, often national- 
specific attributes. The dialogue between Korea and the United 
States, the oldest and largest donor, was often acrimonious at 
the beginning and toward the end of the aid relationship, and 
generally productive over some issues in the middle period. 
The early economic aid relationships of the 1950s were 
marked by often bitter disputes over exchange rates, money sup- 
ply, uses of local currency generated by foreign imports supplied 
under aid, corruption, and stabilization programs. It was not 
fruitful. Just prior to the end of the concessional aid rela- 
tionship with the United States, there wer2 the beginnings of 
disputes about trade, quotas, marketing agreements, and dumping 
issues. Many of these still continue xa are likely to increase. 
In the mid-1960s, the relationship and dialogue were generally 
productive. 
One characteristic of this policy dialog10 stands out: 
foreign observers of Korea's economic growth have consistently 
underestimated the capacity of that Government to mobilize inter- 
nal support for its program and reach its targets. If one as- 
sumes that these advisers were well aware of the international 
economic factors affecting Korea's potential growth, then their 
failing must have been in misinterpreting the internal Korean 
scene. 
Policy dialogue is not necessarily advocacy of a view that 
is solely externally generated and is not held by a significant 
number of officials within a host government. It is rather more 
effective to support those progressive policy views held by a 
portion of the recipient bureaucracy, so that foreign assistance 
on economic policy is a lever to be used not by an outsider, but 
by an insider in internecine policy debates. 
The Korean case demonstrates this point. Policy changes 
were made when such changes were pushed internally and were per- 
ceived to be in the interests of the regime in power and not 
directed toward the dilution of such power. There is consider- 
able evidence, for example, that the $300 million structural 
adjustment loan by the IBRD of October 1983 stipulating certain 
policy shifts (such as liberalization of imports and the elimina- 
tion of grain subsidies by 1 9 8 6 )  stimulated reforms that impor- 
tant elements in the Korean Government wt;e already prepared to 
make, and at best accelerated the process of inevitable change. 
This should not be surprising. 
Conversely, as has previously been noted, poliry recommen- 
dations from outside, when perceived to be somehow detrimental to 
the interests of the government in power, were ignored whenever 
possible. Overall, the Syngman Rhee era demonstrates this axiom 
as do lack of reform of the cooperative movement, early efforts 
to liberalize grain prices, and banking and import reforms in the 
earlier periods. 
Conversations with individuals knowledgeable about the 
period indicate that in the 1960s Korea participated in standby 
agreements with the IMF not because the money was really neces- 
sary, but because the agreements enabled the Government tc assure 
the international community of its creditworthiness. There were 
cases, especially in the mid-1960s, wher, assistance levels in any 
one year were tied, within limits, to modest types of reform, but 
these reforms although important, never questioned the power base 
of the regime. One AID study indi~ated that Korean "economic 
ministries used the conditions precedent of the program loans (in 
the 1960s) to counteract inflationary programs or policies pro- 
posed by other ministries. The program loan provided Finance 
Ministry economists with an excuse for unpopular policies they 
wanted to carry through anyway. "l3l 
The issue through much of the 1950s and 1960s was stabiliza- 
tion. In the later 1960s, the United States used the "program 
lean," amounting to about 3-4 percent of the total aid package in 
any year, as an incentive to the Koreans to meet several highly 
specific targets in relation to stabilization. "The program loan 
was introduced as a carrot, a marginal element of assistance, but 
one specifically aimed at stimulating better stabilization per- 
formance."l32 The concept seems to have been to delay funding 
if targets were not achieved (performance in meeting one objec- 
tive could be substituted for one not met), not to withhold funds 
indefinitely. 
The U.S. position, however, was compLex. "Moreover, since 
our lU.S.1 political objectives could not permit real damage to 
the Korean economy, and since funds were never unlimited, we had 
to use available funds for dual purposes: to withhold for 
punishment and then making [them] again available. "133 The 
failure to meet targets and thus the temporary denial of support 
under program loans amounted to relatively small reductions. For 
131~lizabeth Carter, "Korea," in The Use of Program Loans to 
Influence PC-icy, AID Evaluation Paper 1A, March 1970. confi- 
-- 
denLial (since declassified). 
example, in 1967 the $15 million loan was reduced to $12.5 
million. The important force may have been the inchoate threat 
of public disclosure of such failures, which was not made, and 
not the funds involved, as the regime at that time was unpopular 
in many circles and had not yet established its economic legiti- 
macy. In addition, the AID study concluded that "knowledge that 
the United States had withheld aid for poor performance might 
weaken Korea's credit standing and ability to borrow from other 
lenders. "134 
The Korean-American relationship, as characterized in the 
study quoted, may not have been as confrontaticnal or monolithic 
as presented. By 1970, in any case, the study noted that "what 
started as a largely U.S. program, accepted by the Koreans as 
necessary to get the required aid, became a joint program, and 
now is becoming increasingly a Korean program. If leverage and 
its use has diminished, the need for it has also decreased."l35 
The effects of training and of the constant dialogue of 
expatriate advisers over long periods cannot be measured, for the 
success of the policy dialogue occurs when the changes are inter- 
nalized within a government and are not perceived to be of exter- 
nsl initiation. AS such, it is virtu~lly impossible to evaluate 
such policy changes and pinpoint their origins, although anec- 
dotally it is evident that in some cases it was important. The 
degree to which such policies are internalized is probably 
directly correlated to the effectiveness of the changes 
proposed. 
4 . 5  - Food Assistance and Korean Development 
Except for high-value, specialty crops and perishable vege- 
tables, Korea today has little comparative advantage in food pro- 
duction. Rice costs over two times the world market price to 
produce, livestock costs about 1.8 times the Australian imports, 
corn and soybeans are three and one-half times more expensive and 
red peppers and sesame six times more expensive to cultivate than 
those grown in India. Although Korea is now remarkably produc- 
tive in terms of yields, it has not been able to feed itself 
since world War 11,136 
136~ot a summary discussion, see Steinberg et al., Korean Agricul- 
tural Services, Appendix D. 
There is considerable evidence that food assistance to Korea 
was essential to the country at an early period but was later 
counterproductive, The supply of food, especially during and 
following the Korean War, was vital to the continuation of the 
existence of the Republic of Korea. The disruption of agri- 
cultural production and the fact that Korea, during much of that 
period, was a nation of refugees required a relief operatian. 
After this period, however, food aid produced decidedly 
mixed results for the Republic, although the program was emi- 
nently successful from the vantage point of the donor. Food 
assistance from the United Scates is designed to serve general, 
often contradictory, purposes: rid the United States of agri- 
cultural surpluses, create markets for U.S. sdpplies, support 
foreign policy objectives, and assist the development process in 
the country concerned. The program accomplished all of these 
goals, but to the detriment of elements of the Korean population 
for significant periods of time. 
The food assistance program was designed not only to feed a 
people who could not be self-sufficient at that time, but to 
generate local currency tLat was used to support the overall 
budget of the Korean Government. The program at various periods 
in the 1950s accounted for up to 85 percent of all imports, and 
thus was critical to the continuation of that Government. 
Through much of this period the Korean currency was overvalued, 
and thus it was in the interests of the Korean Government to keep 
the level of food aid as high as possiale. (It should be remem- 
bered that PT, 480, although normally composed of food, did also 
incl~de significant portions of nonfood stocks, such as cotton 
and tobacco. 
Food aid enabled the governments of both Syngman Rhee and 
Park Chung Hee to ignore the inequities in the pricing of rice 
and barley, placing the economic burden on farmers, while using 
the funds generated for other purposes. There is some evidence 
that food aid was diverted for military purposes.137 There 
seems little doubt that food aid retarded agricultural pricing 
reform for perhaps a decade and a half. By allowing "development 
loans" to be used for importing rice, as was done in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the United States in effect increased the 
PL 483 program. "This use of AID funds in conjunction with 
increased PL 480 imports appears to serve as a disincenti~?~ for 
the ROKG [Korean Government] to seek an early solution t~ 
problems in its agricultural sector."l38 It is significant that 
ouly when internal political factors intervened, and when PL 480 
- - 
1 3 7 ~ ~ 0 ,  "Report to the U.S. Congressw, 1972. 
was transformed from grant to loan, did the Korean Government 
move to change its agricultural pricing policies. 
As the types of U.S. surpluses changed, the donor supplied 
more wheat than rice to Korea. With a growing urban population, 
this dietary shift may have been inevitable, but it was probably 
speeded up by the food program. Because it was approximately 
equally nutritious but less costly, the argument may be made that 
it was desirable. The effect on Korean production was apparent. 
As rice prices were raised and as the urban population increased, 
the acreage in wheat and aggregate production fell. Whereas 
Korea once had been 36 percent self-sufficient in wheat, it is 
now 2 percent. Food imports, including grains for human and ani- 
mal consumption, in 1983 totaled some $ 2 . 2  billion, or about 10 
percent of total imports.139 
Although the political goal of food self-sufficiency in 
general and in rice in particular is often articulated by the 
Government and reflected in the press, the former will not be 
achieved, but the latter is possible assuming that consumption of 
wheat will grow. The goal of a state need not be food self- 
sufficiency but rather self-reliance, the latter meaning that the 
state is able to generate sufficient foreign exchange to pay for 
any food it must import to meet its requirements. Korea can, of 
course, be self-reliant in food, but its comparative advantage 
lies in specialized crops rather than in food grains. At this 
stage, ho~sver, it is politically impossible for any regime in 
Korea to ignore rice production, and pressures from such sources 
as the United States to rely on U.S. food imports are even more 
unpalatable in Korea than they are in Japan. Food aid or trade, 
of course, inherently has internal political ramifications for 
the supplier, and Korea or other nations in their own self- 
interest must weigh carefully such external dependencies. Such 
dependencies have created ai'litional problems for Korea, as wit- 
nessed by the rice purchai-? scandals, pressures on Korea to buy 
one type of rice (from specific U . S .  states) as opposed to a dif- 
ferent variety (from another state), as Koreans have distinct 
tastes in rice. There have also been problems with Australian 
meat imports. 
139~overnment of the Republic of Korea, Statistical Yearbook 1984, 
as reported by the Korea Economic Devel3pment Institute of 
Aaerica. 
4.6 The Private Sector and the Marketplace 
The Government has dominated the private sector in Korea. 
Historical reasons for this stem in part from the distribution of 
Japanese assets following liberation, a large portion of which 
went to government, but, more important, there has been a long 
and essentially unbroken tradition of centralization and Govern- 
ment control. In general, the degree of Government involvement 
in the economy statistically has been under-represented, as the 
Government tobacco, ginseng, and energy monopolies are sometimes 
included as private sector in national-accounts figures on Korea, 
~overnment involvement in regulating and influencing the 
business community occurs through both formal and informal mecha- 
nisms and is profound. 
The [Economic Planning] Board and the ministries have 
the power to change, without approval of the National 
Assembly, taxes, tariffs, subsidies, public utility 
rates, interest rates, controlled prices of selected 
goods, and licenses for imports, investment, use of 
foreign exchange, new business, and so on And they 
have wielded this power, frequently .... 146 
Yet the private sector is dynamic in Korea, despite this 
centralized and pervasive public influence. Testament to this 
comes from the figures on business formation and failure and the 
rapid growth of the chaebol, as well as manufacturing and 
exports. Yet this dynamism is one that has been kept within 
bounds by a Government anxious to achieve its economic (and poli- 
tical) goals, in which the private sector plays an important 
part. 
The Government has intervened in the private sector irl a 
variety of ways, including control over the allocation of credit, 
the determination (or, more usually, veto power) over senior 
business staff, and the composition of the corporations, as well 
as through pricing policies, planning, industrial strategy, and 
tax policies. The Government has a clear perception of what it 
wants the private sector to accomplish. Significantly, the busi- 
ness community has not yet competed for political power. The 
private sector also offers important avenues for social and eco- 
nomic mobility to elements of the population, although the tradi- 
tional elites maintain control at the top (along with the 
military). 
140youngil Lim, op. cit., p.10. 
Significantly, in 1983, the Korean Government divested 
itself of all nationwide commercial banks and reduced its control 
over daily operations of these banks, granting greater autonomy 
in personnel management, organization, and budgeting matters. 
The Korean Government has taken several steps toward libera- 
lizaticn in the financial sector. To promote competition among 
deposit money banks, the Monetary Board in January 1982 abolished 
the system of direct credit controls for each deposit money bank 
and began conducting monetary policy through reserve require- 
ments, rediscounts, and open market operations. The system of 
preferential lending rates of commercial banks and the guidelines 
for professional lending were also eliminated in 1982. 
The Government has maintained steadfast control over the 
composition of exports and the nature of heavy and defense 
industries (import substitution efforts) through the allocation 
of credit, because most Korean private firms are heavily in debt. 
This pervasive Government control is somewhat relaxed after 
export goals are articulated, If an enterprise engages in 
exports, "most government restrictions are substantially relaxed 
or become irrelevent. Put another way, under this system an 
exporter operates in a nearly free market and enjoys access to 
the world market prices of inputs and outputs .... In contrast, 
the incentive system has penalized domestic sales. "141 Export 
activities remove the strictures on the relatively small internal 
Korean market, and thus, "The export incentive system directs 
entrepreneurial energies to the wide-open world market, where one 
firm's gain does not reduce the sales opportunities of other 
f irms--the zero-sum nature of the domestic firm is avoided. "142 
Tne monopoly on institutional credit has raised curb market 
lending rates, and the gap between curb market and institutiona- 
lized rates is so great that official credit has taken on the 
character of subsidized credit internally, and in exports it more 
nearly approximates world credit rates. It is remarkable that 
the 30 largest Korean firms had 48 perzent of total bank loans in 
March 1984, and the five largest firms (~yundai, Daewoo, Samsung, 
Ssangyong, and Lucky-Goldstar) held 24.2 percent of outstanding 
loans. As of Dec~rnber 31, 1983, the loans of the 30 largest 
firms represented 457 percent of their combined paid-in capital. 
The Government has also regulated prices in a bewildering 
array of materials, goods, and services. These include the pro- 
ducer and consumer prices of grains, of which rice is the most 
important, fertilizers, and other consumption goods extending to, 
1411bid., p.18. 
1421 --• bid ' p. 21. 
for example, the cost of accounting services. It has controlled 
wages in many fields and, in general, controls have been slngu- 
larly pervasive, although allowing the private sector to flourish 
within limits im~osed by the Government. 
As the economy has become more complex, efforts have in- 
creased within the Korean Government to loosen the tight reins 
with which the private sector has been held in check. Especially 
important has been liberalization of the banking system and 
imports. These attempts have been strengthened by donors, as 
well as trading partners, and there seems little doubt that offi- 
cial Government strictures over the private sector will relax in 
time, but stronq vested interests will try to continue ccntrol. 
It is also likely that informal means will be found by the execu- 
tive branch to control any developments within the private sector 
that it feels are detrimental either to the growth of the economy 
as a whole or its political power in particular. Overall, how- 
ever, the efficiency of the private sector has been the result of 
entrepreneurial activities. "Government functions as a mark.et- 
augmenting instrument and, fortunately, was ~ e a k  in producing a 
market-repressing or rent-creating effect."l43 
There were complaints that the United States, as primary 
donor in the 1950s, did not do enou h to assist the development 
of the private sector at that time. 744 Even later, similar 
sources noted that U.S. funds contributed to Government- 
contralled industries, thus perpetuating state involvement in 
industry, and that AID funds, designed to help small- and medium- 
size firms, went to assist large, well-established enter- 
prises.145 In retrospect, it is likely that any further efforts 
that might have been made to help the private sector in the 1950s 
would have produced little in terms of tangible results. As 
Korea entered the Park Chung Hee eta, there was considerable 
excess capacity in a wide variety of manufacturing fields, but 
the overvalued exchange rate discouraged exports. The argument 
that more representatives of the private sector might have been 
trained is, however, a valid one. 
Donors have materially assisted the development of the pri- 
vate sector, but none has seemed determined or able to liberalize 
the policies of the Government toward the private sector overall 
beyond new banking and import policies, and then only after many 
years of quiet negotiations. Foreign concessional assistance, 
therefore, has made a positive contribution to the growth of the 
1431bid., - pp.66-67. 
1 4 4 ~ ~ 0 ,  "Audit ~eport," 1957. 
1 4 5 ~ ~ 0 ,  1972. 
private sector, but has had m l y  a marginal influence on policy 
toward it. The private sector, in turn, has responded effi- 
ciently and well toward foreign assistance credits that were made 
available by the donors. Relending by banking institutions has 
been efficient, with admirable repayment rates and only a very 
small percentage of overdue loans (in contrast to the 1950s). 
Donors, especially through the structural adjustment loan of 
1983, will have an effect on grain prices, which will over time 
bring rice costs into line with international prices, although 
this may significantly lower rural incomes and may (for internal 
political reasons) take longer than anticipated. 
4.7 Aid Levels and Aid Effectiveness 
What is the relationship, if any, between the levels of con- 
cessional foreign assistance and the effectiveness, if any, of 
such support? The question is simplistically phrased, but the 
issue is complex a d ,  of course, varies with time and circumstan- 
ces. 
The level of concessional assistance can be critical to the 
continued existence of the state, as it was in Korea in the 
1950s. It can be vital in countries in danger of default. In 
between these extremes, however, the levels of foreign assist- 
ance, if Korea is a typical example, have far less correlation 
with the effective use of foreign aid than do a number of other 
factors. 
Concessional foreign assistance has been of modest propor- 
tions compared with commerical flows since the early 1970s. The 
complete halt of concessional aid (including all assistance from 
the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Japan) would probably 
have had only the most marginal statistical effect on the econ- 
omy, although if caused by dissatisfaction with Korean perfor- 
mance would no doubt affect commercial lending. On the other 
hand, increases in such assistance within reasonable limits would 
probably also have had little statistical influence on Korea. 
Tbe effectiveness of foreign aid thus is not necessarily measured 
by its amount, although under certain (relatively extreme) cir- 
cumstances this becomes important. 
Numerous Korean officials have commented that the value of 
foreign assistance, especially that of the World Banv in the 
later period and the United States earlier, was the influence 
that the donor brought in support of certain institutions or con- 
cepts within the Korean Government. The interest and views 
expressed by the donors, both in policies and projects, enabled 
some Korean technocrats to convince the top executive and 
legislative branch leadership that certain policies and 
approaches were important. This seems to have been a highly 
significant factor, at least to the recipients. 
External analysis of the world economy and how Korea fits 
into this picture, together with a view of the Korean performance 
and goals seen in comparative perspective, were other important 
aspects of donor involvement transcending support levels, as 
exolained by Korean officials, 
Donor support can help build institutions, such as those in 
the financial sector, and can help to train individuals at costs 
that are exceedingly small (even if rising) in comparison to 
their impact. Thus, the level of support is less important than 
the types-of assistance, the acumen of the advisory services 
iwhen they are perceived to further Korean goals), and the 
prestige that is attached to donor activity. Insofar as donor 
assistance introduced new technological processes, in the Korean 
context these were important beyond the level of supporc pro- 
vided. There is an additional factor: continued donor support 
wqerates confidence in the economy in international (and local) 
c mmercial circles and probably, in some unquantifiable way, 
contributes to a major degree to nonconcessional lending. Such 
donor assistance may be perceived by commercial lenders or 
investors as lowering their risks. This attribute of donor 
assistance should not be overlooked, for it does not appear on 
the balance sheets of economic growth. 
Overall, the level of support from foreign donors to Korea, 
except for the initial period after the Korean War, was less 
important than its indirect effects, which continued, and still 
continue, to h ?  substantial. Thus, the rationale for bilateral 
donor phasing ;at of concessional assistance to countries solely 
on the basis of such ephemeral or questionable statistics as per 
capita income is highly suspect, for the importance of such 
efforts transcends the volume of aid and the immediate eLmomic 
impact of such support. Such phaseouts, as in the U.S. withdraw- 
al of concessional assistance to Korea or Taiwan, are likely to 
be motivated more by the internal political requirements of the 
donor (at least in the United States) than they are by the objec- 
tive conditions in the recipient nation. 
Donor coordination in the Korean context has not appeared to 
be a problem, most importantly because the depth of Korean 
planning and implementation competence is so great that donor 
projects can readily be accommodated in the bureaucratic process, 
in co3trast to the situation in many countries. The small number 
of significant donors has no doubt made the task easier. Central 
planning conceptually has allowed donors to meld their and Korean 
priorities, which is in distinct contrast to the situation in 
many countries in which planning cmsists of a catalogue of many 
disparate, discrete projects without adequate priorities attached 
or interrelationships considered. 
AID comments on the initial aid group meetings on Korea in 
1966 and 1968 indicate that these meetings were formalistic and 
that important issues were either not raised or, if raised, not 
resolved, Although donor coordination through such annual or 
biannual meetings is useful, it evidently is not sufficient for 
either policy or project-level coordination. 
The issue of the tying of foreign aid to the purchases of 
goods and services of the donor has been important in the past in 
Korea. There have been accusations that early U.S. assistance 
levels to Korea were not truly reflective of the support pro- 
vided, because U.S. goods and services were overpriced. At the 
same time, some of these goods were of third-country (especially 
Japanese) origins. 
The issue todzy is focused on Japan. Japan has untied most 
of its aid, but the economies of scale, location, and the effect 
of linguistic experience (since Koreans over 45 years can speak 
Japanese, and Japanese is easier for a Korean to learn because of 
structural similarities--the reverse is obviously also true) all 
have meant that Japanese goods, services, and training naturally 
predominate in the Korean foreign assistance marketplace. It is 
unlikely that this will soon change. Although the Japanese role 
in Korea must be delicately managed (an issue recognized by both 
governments), the Korean trade deficits with Japan ars likely to 
continue and Japan will also dominate the Korean aid picture. 
4.8 Technoloqical and Institutional Factors -
Foreign assistance in the early period of Korean growth, 
prior to the expansion of the export drive, was the principal 
means through which technological improvements were introduced. 
This occurred through the provision of goods, technical advisory 
services, and perhaps most importantly for the longer term, 
through training of Koreans overseas. 
As exports expanded and the volume of concessional assist- 
ance diminished relative to commercial flows, the means to 
acquire technology shifted. Advisory services continued, but at 
a reduced rate. Institutionally generated (as opposed to pri- 
vately sponsored) overseas training also diminished, although the 
number of Korean students presently (1984) studying in the United 
States is at one of its highest levels. Technological change has 
come about less through investing than it has through trade. As 
the Koreans produce for export on specifications stipulated by 
foreign buyers, the technological improvements have quickly been 
absorbed into the Korean industrial economy. 
Although foreign assistance can be credited for assisting 
the establishment of some institutions critical to the develop- 
ment process (such as the Office of Rural Development, combicing 
agricultural research and extension; the Korean Institute of 
Science and Technology; the Korean Development Institute; and the 
Korean Educational Development Institute, to mention a few), the 
impetus for the majority of institutional innovations came from 
within the Korean Government. The continuing foreign role 
through such aonors as the UNDP is to strengthen such organiza- 
tions. The wedding of technology and institutional growth is 
apparent in the increase in the percentage of GNP directed to 
research and development--now less than , percent but scheduled 
to rise to over 2 percent. The institutional focus f ~ r  such 
research, however, will not be in the Government-sponsored multi- 
tude of parastatal research institutes but in private industrial 
organizations directly focused on furthering manufacturing and 
export goals. 
The donor role in both technology and institutional develop- 
ment has been important and generally effective in the past but 
has been superceded by the growth of private sector and trade 
functions. When Korea began Its export drive, its institutional 
structure was essentially in place, in contrast to the situation 
in many other nations. 
Donors have asked whether project, sector, or program 
lending or assistance was the most effective or efficient method 
of as>*istance. The issue cannot be resolved simply, for at 
varimls levels of development, and in varying circumstances, as 
w.11 as under certain types of donor constraints, each, or a com- 
bination of all, may be appropriate. 
Project assistance, when it was effective and accomplished 
its discrete ends, was focused on specific, limited objectives. 
It thus proved useful when there was overall agreement on sec- 
1 
toral goals or purposes. Sector or program lending, usually 
larger, was at a broader level of goal or purpose abstraction, 
and could be more important in furthering mutually agreed-upon 
objectives. Program lending or (in the earlier period) grants 
would, one would assume, have greater policy impact, and indeed 
this may have been 'rue when such support furthered Government 
directions already established. It was less effective when there 
were policy disputes. 
Thus, there are few generalizations that can be drawn from 
the Korean experience on the most appropriate mix of project, 
sector, or program lending or grants. What seems evident, 
however, is that mut -ly agreeable sector lending or program 
goals can be reinforced through discrete projects but that good 
projects may not necessarily lead to sectoral policy reform. 
Thus, the most appropriate mix of these three elements is bound 
by the objective conditions of the recipient, the donor, and the 
overall interaction between the two, and remains an eaigma 
without universal aaplication. 
5. CODA: LESSONS FROM THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE 
The successes of Korean growth and, perhaps more important, 
its sustcinability despite a variety of adverse economic znd 
political factors have prompted donors and the Korean Government 
to espouse Korea as a development model, the former to demon- 
strate their own efficacy, and the latter for its own internal 
and foreisn policy reasons. 
This simplistic approach is, however, unlikely to be 
attractive to development specialists--in contrast to those in 
the popula~ press--who rightly see it as a complex process highly 
dependent on singularly Korean factors and the world economy at a 
particular point in time. 
This does not mean, however, that lessons cannot be drawn 
from the Korean experience regarding factors influencing or 
affecting recipients and donor capacity. It should be remembered 
that all foreign donors, except the United States, began their 
operations in Korea after that country hz3 set its economic house 
in some sort of rational order. These donors have thus been 
spared the earlier, less tfficacious period of Korean history 
when economic assistance and its use could never have been con- 
ceived of as a positive model. 
5.1 The Develo~ina Nations 
From the viewpoint of the recipient of foreign aid, Korea 
demonstrates the need for strocg political will with economic 
development as an articulated, critical priority for the politi- 
cal elite. It also validates the concept that the delivery 
institutions to spread these ideas must be in place or first must 
be built. Implementation of programs and projects then becomes 
exceedingly important. This is a factor on which many countries 
founder; without sound implementation, the most sophisticated 
?nd elaborate planning will fail. 
To be successful in influencing policy, Kored's experience 
points out, it is important ta work with the host government 
bureaucratic structure to elicit change that is perceived by that 
government as in its own interests, preferably originating inter- 
nally. Korea demonstrates that policy dialogue is useful and 
important over time, eve? if its influence cannot normally be 
quantified, but that it will not produce positive results unless 
it somehow furthers the overall direction that the state is 
taking and is regarded as being in the interests of those in 
power. 
The process of change can be speeded up but is unlikely to 
be altered radically until the government is prepared to make 
such a move. It is also anlikely that significant alteration in 
the amounts of assistance will affect the courses of such change, 
although it might well affect the technical aspects of some pre- 
determined decision. 
Although funds may not be completely fungible, there is 
enough flexibility in the foreign aid process that assistance 
will not necessarily deter a country from pursuing its own devel- 
opmental goals even though foreign assistance speciaiists may 
advise against such moves. It is only when a country reaches a 
serious economic strait bordering on default that major pressures 
can be placed on those societies. 
Foreign aid organizations prefer to consider themselves 
~ristine and divorced from domestic politics. Although there is 
more justification for such an attitude by multilateral agencies, 
there seems to be confusion between providing assistance for 
political purposes (often the rationale of bilateral donors) and 
the intimate association of the internal economic and political 
processes in any state. This association must be understood for 
aid to succeed. 
Korea demonstrates that land reform is likely to be the 
single most important criterion for overall equitable distribu- 
tion of income in a heavily populated, land-poor developing 
society; yet it is unlikely that many nations today are prepared 
to undertake such a broad redistributive approach to income and 
power. Under such circumstances, the Korean experience points to 
a likely widening of income disparities that may only be offset 
by vast employment opportunities and a major concentration on 
improved productivity, which seem essential to increasing wages 
in this highly competitive world situation. 
Korea offers some disquieting lessons from the sgricultural 
sector. Ignored for so long, agriculture i a  Korea began to be 
extremely productive when high levels of diverse types of sub- 
sidization were introduced. At one point Korea recognized that 
this level of support cou1.d no longer be maintained. What is the 
lesson for other nations? Can they (or the donors) supply such 
subsidization if that is what is needed to get agriculture 
moving? If agriculture is to lead development, a path advocated 
by some donors but which Korea did not follow, this raises 
serious developmental issues. Yet the export model, Korea's 
path, may have occurred at a unique time in history and may not 
again be so easily replicable. 
Pricing policies, as Korea illustrates, can be an important 
means by which to provide incentives for growth. As Burma 
iilustrates, however, positive pricing incentives can be replaced 
by implicit or explicit threats of coercion. In Korea, with 
administrative delivery systeTs in place, pricing policies 
worked. Korea also demonst'ates that these incentives, if 
involving extensive subsidies, are unlikely to be maintained 
indefinitely. 
If pricing policies have been effective, the pricing of 
foreign exchange has been a critical facto: in growth. Thus, the 
maintenance of a realistic foreign ex:hange rate has proven to be 
of the utmost importance in exports, an obvious fact but one that 
seems to be ignored in many societies. 
The growth of trade, however, and of per capita income 
should not :lecessarily result in the complete halt of concession- 
a1 assistance, which performs other functions. Such aid attracts 
commercial investment and lending, provides comparative analysis 
of the recipient nation's economy by outside observers, is in a 
sense a window on the world economy, strengthens elements within 
the host government bent on reform or progress, and thus has 
greater utility than the simple measure of funds provided. For- 
eign assistance can be a risk-taking endeavor that prompts 
increased national investment in enterprises, the economic rate 
of return of which may be delayed while the effort may be quite 
innovative. Tc tie concessional assistance to per capita GNP is 
rigid and unimaginative. Why, then, does the Ford Foundation 
operate in the United States? 
Korea also illustrates that the private sector can be effec- 
tive in many ways, even if subservient overall to government, and 
that a public sector is not necessarily inefficient. The experi- 
ence of the earlier Rhee period also supports the view that if 
the foreign assistance focus is directed solely to the private 
sector when other factors are not in place, such assistance may 
be ineffective or be extremely rlow in producing economic re- 
sults. Private sector support requires careful assessment of 
capacity, both political and economic, not simply the application 
of fashionable programmatic formulae. 
Korea also shows that education has been a powerful force in 
supporting economic growth and that this may be one of the most 
effective means by which donors can provide assistance to a de- 
veloping nation. 
Food aid may prove vital to the effective functioning of a 
government and the feeding of its people, but Korea provides evi- 
dence that it can also be instrumental in slowing the process of 
agricultural reform. There may be tension between the shorter 
donor objectives in providing food aid and the longer term goals 
of both the donor and the recipient. 
Korea also illustrates that technology is not simply 
something that can be transferred, except perhaps in export pro- 
cessing enclaves, but must, with policies, be internalized and 
adapted to local circumstances. 
5.2 The Role of Donors 
The role of donors--both bilateral and multilateral, al- 
though there are significant differences ia issues of effective- 
ness--not only reflects conditions in any particular recipient 
nation, but is also based on developmental or organizational hy- 
potheses, articulated and inchoate, that shape their operations. 
There is, for example, a general tendency to regard the 
answers to development probLems as universally applicable. 
Althoush there are, of course, general propositions that may 
apply to certain conditions or actions at various stages of de- 
velopment, however defined, these general laws are circumscribed 
by the local milieu, which may radically alter the applicability 
or suitability of generally prescribed development solutions. 
Koreans have accused some donors of a formula-type approach to 
analysis of Korean problems when these were not applicable. This 
attitude results in donors regarding their staff as equally com- 
petent to work on sectoral development problems in any society. 
Emphasis cn technical specialization alone presents the danger of 
donors negle-ting the vital noneconomic factors that have been 
demonstrated '9 have bsen so important in, for example, Korean 
development success. Donors then should reexamine their admi- 
nistrative patterns to ensure that both disciplinary and 
geographic area competence are represented in any c~untry analy- 
sis. The implications for internal tureaucratic cnanges, if this 
issue is recognized, are important and may be traumatic. This 
may be why such issues have rarely been addressed by some donors. 
It is evident that there is some confusion among senior 
Korean officials aboct the rationale of various types of donor 
support and the purposes of each. norea moved from U.S. nonproj- 
ect assistance, including food aid, to project grants and loans. 
The IBRD has provided first project support and then two struc- 
tural adjustment loans. There is a feeling in Seoul that sector 
lending may be the next mode, and there is legitimate confusion 
in certain Korean circles over the rationale for each. 
Project lending implies discrete activities, manageable 
within specific bureaucratic and specialized agencies. Struc- 
tural adjustment loans, larger by far, are managed by the central 
planning agency of the government. Sector lendirg is in some 
sense a median position. Although it is generally true that sec- 
tor or structural adjustment lending allows easier coordination 
of broader policy issues than projects, the general position 
eeems to be that neither sector or program lending nor structural 
adjustment loans (except for emergency considerations) will force 
a nation to agre? to policy changes that are perceived to be 
detrimental to their conception of the distribution of power. At 
the level of Korea's development, however, major sector or struc- 
tural adjustnent lending may be more appropriate not because of 
the policy chacges that may be required by a donor, but because 
it is administratively more efficient for both donors and such 
recipients, 
Donors seem bound by the mystiq~e of aggregate data and the 
issue of the concessionality of assistance, Although analysts 
recognize that such issues are often of limited meaning. interest 
rates and esident aid programs are often determined on the basis 
of such factors. Yet few countries have such balanced develop- 
ment that foreign assistance on concessional terms might not be 
desirable for specialized, relatively high-risk undertakings. 
Finally, what has been the relative experience in Korea be- 
tween bilateral and multilateral donors? Korea in this instance 
may not be typical, because of the two bilateral donors, Japan 
has intentionally avoided a high-profile, policy-oriented role, 
and the United States was important because it was essentially 
the cnly donor in the early period and because economic 
assistance and military security were intimately intertwiqed in 
the views of both the United States and Korea. 
Bilateral donors are often bound by their own foreign policy 
considerations (which were important in determining the level of 
U.S. assistance) and even internal donor political factors 
(PL 480, and the phaseout of the AID program). and thus are espe- 
cially vulnerable. Multilateral oryanizatio:is, however, can be 
bound by bureaucratic or operating procedures that effectively 
restrict the breadth of their developmental approaches, In other 
words, all development agency bureaucracies suffer from defects. 
It is likely, however, that multilateral organizations can more 
easily transcend their defects than can bilateral donors, at 
least those with pervasive nondevelopment interests. 
There is, however, a role for bilateral donors, especially 
at earlier stages of development when administrative competencies 
in host government institvitions are limited, for they can perhaps 
more easily supply resident staff with greater stakes in project 
success than have contractors without longer range commitments to 
developmental growth. 
If, however, multilateral donors are to maintain the 
prestige they have attained, the quality and candor of their eco- 
nomic, social, and political analysis need to be strengthened. 
Bilateral donors can no longer afford to do the economic analyses 
that the multilateral donors do. It is therefore essential that 
such analyses be as open and encompassing as possible. 
The success of Korea is undoubted. Its acsomplishments 
offer hope for other nations, but its lessons must be careiully 
extracted from t h o s e  considerable, and n o t  y e t  fully explored, 
factors that have made Korea unique. 
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